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Israel and Palestine offer a complicated example of an environmental management problem. 
They are in conflict with each other but share the same ecosystem and environmental problems. 
Additionally, Israel is a prosperous developed nation, while the West Bank is a territory under 
great economic strain. Given these diverse features, evaluating the contrasts and interactions 
between environmental management in Israel and the West Bank provides insight into 
approaches to handling climate change and depletion of common resources in a global context. 
In this thesis, I investigate the question: How do environmental management institutions 
associated with water quality, water scarcity, and waste management in Israel compare to those 
in the West Bank? I find that Israel’s environmental management is more developed than that of 
the West Bank in terms of infrastructure and precision of legislation. Both, however, face 
enforcement challenges rooted in inefficient institutional frameworks and lack of public 
engagement. Given their proximity and interdependence, they simultaneously damage their own 
and each other’s environmental and public health. This interdependence also precludes unilateral 
change. Neither can solve its environmental problems on its own; they must collaborate, but this 
collaboration necessitates radical political and institutional change. Nonetheless, recent 
developments provide hope on this front. 
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Chapter 1: 
The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and Environmental Management 
Introduction 
In the summer of 2018, I studied abroad in Israel-Palestine, and we divided our time 
between the West Bank, where we worked on a farm, and Israel, where we visited museums, 
schools, and monuments. As we crossed back and forth between the territories, I noticed how 
much more litter there was in the streets of the West Bank compared to the Israeli cities we 
visited. The dirt road leading to the farm entrance was lined with plastic wrappers, and there was 
paper caught in plants along the roads in Beit Sahour and Bethlehem. There was also no 
recycling system in the area that our host families participated in. At the same time, however, 
there was strong awareness of water and electricity conservation. Massive black water jugs and 
shiny solar panels lined the roofs in Palestinian cities and towns across the territory. After 
witnessing the visible differences in waste management and apparent cultural differences in 
water use between the West Bank and Israel, I wondered how and why two territories, so 
intimately connected by resources, conflict, and livelihood managed their environments so 
differently enough that it was visible to a visitor. 
The Global North, the world’s richest and most powerful countries often export their 
environmental problems in the form of trash and resource extraction to the Global South. The 
developing countries must therefore deal with these issues imposed by the developed countries in 
addition to their own increased vulnerability to climate catastrophes given their geography, 
resources, and technology (Benedict, 2019). These relationships are marked by power 
asymmetries and conflicting interests. The relationship between the West Bank and Israel is an 
example of the relationship between the Global North and Global South. Yet both face the same 
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environmental issues given that they occupy the same space – they share the same ecosystem – 
making this particular situation both unique and universal. Israel and the West Bank both face 
issues concerning water scarcity and waste management, but they are also in conflict with each 
other, a conflict that lies fundamentally in control over the land and thus control of the natural 
resources and environment (Wolf, 1995). 
This context and my own observation while visiting led me to the question: How do the 
environmental management institutions associated with water quality, water scarcity, and waste 
management in Israel compare to those in the West Bank? In particular, why do they lead to 
differing environmental management practices and outcomes? Additionally, what constrains 
their ability to adopt a more efficient and cooperative approach to management of their shared 
environment? In my investigation, I have found that Israel’s environmental management is more 
developed than that of the West Bank, in terms of infrastructure and precise legislation, but both 
face enforcement challenges that result in negative environmental and public health impacts for 
each other as well as themselves. The inevitably interdependent relationship between the two 
territories’ environmental management means that neither can solve its own environmental 
management problems without the other doing the same in addition to working together for the 
protection of the environment and public health. 
In this chapter, I will first give a historical overview of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
focusing specifically on territory control, as it applies to environmental management. Next, I 
include a literature review focusing on two primary issues in environmental management: 
institutional issues and problems posed by the general public. The literature is both general and 
specific to Israel and the West Bank. The following section explains the methodology and design 
Schneider 3 
of this project, outlining the comparative methodology and sources used. Finally, I provide an 
overview of the next four chapters. 
Historical Overview 
The land of Israel and Palestine has been fought over for centuries for its cultural 
significance as well as its geographical advantages. Researchers argue that natural resources, 
specifically water, have been a primary source of these conflicts, but cultural claims to the land 
have also played significant roles in justifying conflicts throughout history, particularly in the 
past century (Giordano, 2018; Wolf, 1995). The past century has perpetuated the land’s 
reputation as a conflict zone, now known for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a topic of much 
controversy and debate.  
Over the course of the twentieth century, the land of Israel, the Golan Heights, Sinai 
Peninsula, West Bank, and Gaza Strip changed hands several times. Following the first World 
War and the fall of the Ottoman empire, Britain took control of Palestine (and Transjordan, 
which was separated in 1922 and became the kingdom of Jordan). Under Britain, the land was 
called Mandate Palestine. Meanwhile, Zionism had been growing in popularity, inspiring many 
Jews to move to Palestine in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century, and in 1917, Britain 
gave support for the settlement of Jewish Zionists in Mandate Palestine in the Balfour 
Declaration (“Israel profile,” 2019). Britain had also, however, ambiguously promised the land to 
the Palestinians in 1915 in an attempt to gain Arab support against the Ottoman (Tahhan, 2018). 
As anti-Semitism grew in Europe, growing numbers of Jews immigrated to Palestine, and 
tensions grew between Britain, the Palestinians, and Zionists, resulting in violent outbreaks 
aimed at all three. This tension and conflicting pressure eventually pushed Britain to plan for 
withdrawal from the area in 1947. That year, the United Nations made a resolution to partition 
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the land into two states, Israel and Palestine, and leave Jerusalem under international control, 
depicted in part one of Figure 1.1 (“Israel profile,” 2019). Both populations wanted more land 
than they had been portioned; most of the Palestinians had been living on the land for centuries, 
and their population was significantly larger than that of the Zionists who had received half the 
land in the partition plan. The Zionists felt that they had a right to the land and that they needed 
more to create a Jewish state that would be safe for Jews. Additionally, there were some Jews 
who had been living on the land as Palestinians their whole lives, complicating the issue further. 
People’s opinions on the matter varied but were colored with an overall dissatisfaction (“Israel 
profile,” 2019). 
Figure 1.1: UN Partition Plan - 1947 
 
(New poll finds far-right views gaining prominence in Israel, 2019)  
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In the end, Israel accepted the UN partition plan, and the Palestinians rejected it. The 
British Mandate ended on 14 May 1948, leaving the situation unresolved. That same day, Israel 
declared its independence, and the first Arab-Israeli war began, resulting in the diaspora of about 
750,000 of 1,200,000 Palestinians (“Israel Profile,” 2019). Following the first Arab-Israeli war, 
the land distribution was as follows: Jordan had control of the West Bank; Egypt controlled the 
Gaza Strip; Israel controlled the rest, about 78% of the land (Tahhan, 2018). Part 2 of Figure 1.1 
shows the land occupied by Israel after this war, which did not change for over two decades. 
Another notable period for environmental management and land control is the mid-1960s. 
In 1964, Israel completed the construction of the National Water Carrier, bringing water from the 
Jordan River into the Negev desert, raising tensions with Jordan and the West Bank over water 
allocations (“Israel Profile,” 2019). That same year, the Arab League, a collection of Middle 
Eastern countries, met and created the Palestine Liberation Organization, an umbrella 
organization including various Palestinian organizations working toward an independent 
Palestinian state, via both peaceful and violent means (Pike, 1998). Tensions between Israel and 
its neighbors built over the next few years, leading to the 6 Day War of 1967. Israel dominated 
over its opponents (Egypt, Syria, and Jordan) and stationed occupying forces in the Sinai 
Peninsula (Egypt), Golan Heights (Syria), Eastern Jerusalem (UN proclaimed international), and 




Figure 1.2: Israel and Palestine Borders 1967 
 
(Klein, 2020)  
Israel returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt after a series of negotiations much later, but 
the remaining territories gained in the 1967 war remain under Israeli occupation or blockade to 
this day, though to varying degrees. The late 1980s was marked by violence for Israel and 
Palestine. Protests in the Palestinian Occupied Territories starting in 1987 were initially non-
violent, but some Palestinian groups soon turned to violence, and Israel responded with force as 
well (Timeline, 2009). This period of uprisings became known as the First Intifada (“Israel 
profile,” 2019). 
In November 1988, the Palestinian National Council declared Palestine to be a state, 
accepting UN resolutions 181, 242, and 338, which include the 1948 partition of Israel and 
Palestine. Soon after, the leader of the PLO, Yasser Arafat, condemned any form of terrorism, 
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and the US agreed to open “substantive dialogue.” Palestine was not internationally recognized 
as a state, however, so its recognition of the 1948 borders was unacknowledged (Timeline, 2009). 
Nonetheless, the early 1990s saw several steps toward an independent Palestinian state following 
decades of Israeli occupation and acts of Palestinian terrorism. In 1993, the leaders of Israel and 
the PLO, representing Palestine, met at what is now called Oslo I, the first of two sessions called 
the Oslo Accords. The first meeting involved mutual recognition of the legitimacy of each party; 
the PLO recognized Israel as a state, and Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the 
Palestinian people. This meeting also established the agenda for Oslo II, which took place in 
1995 (Oslo Accords, 2018). 
The resulting agreement, simply known as the Oslo Accords involved gradually 
increasing Palestinian independence over the course of five-year plans. They agreed upon the 
establishment of the interim governing body, the PNA (now known as the Palestinian National 
Authority or PNA), which would be allowed to govern the Gaza Strip and sections of the West 
Bank for five years. The West Bank was divided into three areas: A, B, and C, shown in Figure 
1.3. The PNA was put in charge of most affairs in Area A, which covers about 18% of the West 
Bank. In Area B, the PNA was given limited power over internal affairs, and this area is about 
21% of the West Bank. Area C, the remaining 61% or so, remained under Israel but was intended 
to be gradually transferred to the Palestinians (What are areas A, B, and C of the occupied West 
Bank?, 2019). After the first five years, border issues and possible expansion of PNA would be 
discussed with the eventual goal of creating an independent Palestinian state (Milestones: 1993–
2000, 2020). 
The Oslo Accords also included discussions about water management, which resulted in 
the Water Agreement as part of the Interim Agreement. Oslo I acknowledged that cooperation is 
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necessary and included proposals for studies and programs on water rights, the development of 
infrastructure, and desalination in appendices three and four. Oslo II included a section titled 
“Water Supply and Sewerage Issues” in the 1995 Interim Agreement, also known as the Water 
Agreement (The Issue of Water between Israel and the Palestinians, 2009). Israel recognized the 
Palestinian water rights in the West Bank, and these would be “discussed and finalized in the 
framework of a permanent arrangement,” an arrangement that has yet to be reached. The 
agreement did ensure that Palestine would receive 118 million cubic meters (MCM) per year in 
addition to an extra 28.6 MCM to provide for “future needs,” such as population growth (The 
Issue of Water between Israel and the Palestinians, 2009). Both sides agreed to use the resource 
sustainably, treating its sewage, and protecting the natural resources. The agreement also 
established a permanent Joint Water Committee, which met regularly from 1995 to 2008 when 
the agreement fell apart. The JWC was in charge of denying and approving construction of water 
infrastructure such as wells in the West Bank, but funding for these projects came from 
international donors. The agreement deteriorated with dissatisfaction for both sides and finally 
ended in 2008 (The Issue of Water between Israel and the Palestinians, 2009). It lasted much 




Figure 1.3: Areas A, B, and C in the West Bank 
 
(Kersel, 2014)  
The next round of negotiations was marked by rising tensions and failed to reach an 
agreement. They finally came to a halt when the Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, refused to 
continue the negotiations in 2001. Shortly afterward, a wave of Palestinian protests and terrorism 
erupted, known as the Second Intifada. This series of uprisings inspired even harsher reactions 
from Israel, which have shaped the current political and environmental landscape of Israel and 
the West Bank (“Israel Profile,” 2019). The early 2000s marked the beginning of Israel’s 
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construction of the separation walls surrounding the Gaza Strip and dividing the West Bank 
along the 1967 border and Areas A, B, and C from the Oslo Accords (“Israel Profile,” 2019). 
The distribution of the land is shown in part four of Figure 1.1. 
 Because the negotiations were stopped prematurely in 2001, Israel maintains control over 
Area C, including environmental management and is considering annexing parts with valuable 
natural resources such as fertile soil and water. The PNA still controls most affairs in Area A and 
education, health, and the economy in Area B. Israeli martial law applies to the occupied 
territories, however, and Israel controls all external affairs for the entire West Bank, including 
security and trade (Haavisto, 2003). The West Bank is therefore enclosed by the Israeli 
checkpoints, which control internal movement within the West Bank and into Israel (What are 
areas A, B, and C of the occupied West Bank?, 2019).  
Literature Review 
The Middle East region faces some of the greatest water scarcity issues of the world, and 
researchers point to resource allocation as an aggravator, if not primary source, of conflict in the 
region (Giordano, 2018; Wolf, 1995). Water scarcity is affected both by natural water flow and 
water quality, often affected by waste management (Al-Khateeb et al., 2017; Al-Khatib et al., 
2010; Ghanem et al., 2019; Tal, 2002). Climate change will exacerbate these issues, which could 
lead to increased conflict as resources become scarce and hence more valuable. The literature 
presents an alternative to conflict, however; increased interdependence between neighboring 
lands based on resource exchange could foster peace (Giordano, 2018). 
        The land of Israel and Palestine is culturally significant to people across the world as well 
as the people living on it, yet the environment in this area suffers from poor management (Al-
Khatib et al., 2010; Ghanem et al., 2019; Tal, 2002). The literature points to two primary reasons 
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for this environmental degradation: trends among the general public, and a lack of resources and 
efficiency among institutions (El-Hamouz, 2008; Hukkinen, 1998; Tal, 2002; Wolf, 1995). 
Trends among the general public including population growth, urbanization, and environmental 
management perceptions play a key role in defining the land’s waste and water management. 
The other challenge is the institutions’ lack of resources and efficiency (El-Hamouz, 2008; 
Hukkinen, 1998; Tal, 2002; Wolf, 1995). Although Israel and the West Bank face varying 
degrees of inefficiency and resource scarcity, both struggle with environmental management 
enforcement and suffer the repercussions of the other’s environmental difficulties (Giordano, 
2018; Tal et al., 2010; Wolf, 1995). Much of the literature focuses on individual issues in one of 
the territories, and those that do compare both focus on one issue, most often water. I offer a 
comparison of Israel and the West Bank’s legislative and actual management in two intimately 
connected areas that are facing challenges exacerbated by climate change and population growth: 
water and waste management. 
Institutional Issues 
       The conversation concerning institutional inadequacy of environmental management 
reaches beyond the Israeli and Palestinian situation into both the developed and developing 
worlds. Hukkinen (1998) considers the dynamics between institutions and individual perceptions 
in environmental management in two Western countries. Hukkinen finds that institutional 
frameworks are often an impediment to developing and implementing sustainable policies 
because of their power over the development of organizations and economy (Hukkinen, 1998). 
Although Hukkinen’s studies represent stable and peaceful political situations, the conclusions 
are still relevant to my study. I consider how these ideas are reversed in Israel’s history; the 
people’s attitudes toward environmental management shaped the institutional framework, which 
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now impede sustainable management (Tal, 2002). Sources directly concerning the West Bank 
and Israel also note the issue Hukkinen discusses; Saadeh et al. (2019) and El-Hamouz (2008) 
both highlight the negative effects of poor governance on waste management in the West Bank. 
As the West Bank population grows, so does its waste generation. However, according to 
Saadeh et al.’s (2019) study of the potential for private-public partnership (PPP) in municipal 
waste management, the West Bank does not have enough facilities to accommodate this growth. 
Space is limited for landfills and waste management facilities, and, as El-Hamouz (2008) also 
points out, public institutions do not manage the space or resources available to their fullest 
capacity. Saadeh et al and El-Hamouz suggest turning to PPPs to solve these inadequacies by 
delegating waste management responsibilities to other organizations. Saadeh et al find a 
successful example of this model in Hebron and Bethlehem but note that it would most likely not 
work without the 50% funding agreement with the World Bank that these cities receive. Saadeh 
et al as well as other papers note the crippling effect that irregular fee collection by the waste 
management authorities has on public institutions (Al-Khateeb et al., 2017; Saadeh et al., 2019). 
The paper, however, focuses primarily on what individual municipalities do, rather than 
considering issues or solutions for waste management at the regional level, which I will consider 
in my evaluation of the national legislation and local effectiveness. 
El-Hamouz focuses on the failure of the waste management institutions in Tubas, a 
district in the West Bank. He notes the importance of financial security, which was ultimately the 
downfall of the district’s private-public partnership with a Jordanian organization, but the paper 
fails to address the need for other donors. Instead, it focuses on how much money the Tubas 
Joint Service Council might save with an efficiently run private-public partnership (El-Hamouz 
2008). Although both of these studies consider the poor execution of the West Bank’s waste 
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management and compare it to potential private involvement, neither look at the situation in 
Israel, which faces similar issues, controls the West Bank’s border, and shares many of its 
resources and space (Tal, 2002). I will address this similarity in my research and consider the 
role of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and its government in the realistic application of 
public-private partnerships. 
Although Israel is an independent country in the Global North, it also has severe 
environmental management issues. Alon Tal (2002) discusses the environmental compromises 
necessary to make Israel function as it does and the system’s negative impacts on public health, 
specifically referencing insufficient sewage treatment in Arab Israeli neighborhoods as an issue 
of environmental injustice. He notes, however, that this pollution does not stay within the Arab 
neighborhoods and also affects Israeli sections of cities. Tal does not, however, discuss the 
effects of the occupation in the Palestinian territories on Israel’s environment. I elaborate on this 
interaction, particularly how the occupation affects enforcement of environmental management 
of both Israeli and Palestinian law and enforcement and thus affects both territories. 
Additionally, although Tal’s assessment of Israeli environmental management covers many of its 
functions and faults, it has a primarily historical and political development focus, and I will 
consider more practical applications that have resulted from this development.  
The perceived dichotomy of economy versus sustainability appears throughout the 
discussions of environmental management enforcement and application in Israel and the West 
Bank (El-Hamouz, 2008; Giordano, 2018; Saadeh et al., 2019; Tal, 2002; Tal et al., 2010). El-
Hamouz brings it up as a primary reason for poor waste collection in the Tubas district and, 
similarly to Saadeh et al., therefore emphasizes the economic incentives of PPPs both for the 
people and for the public institutions. Al-Khatib et al. (2010) also note the heavy price tag 
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associated with environmental management, citing it as a primary reason for inconsistent 
environmental management. Tal et al. (2010) focused on this issue in the context of 
environmental policy enforcement in Israel by comparing criminal enforcement to administrative 
enforcement. The study found that criminal enforcement was more effective in part because of 
its stronger deterrence than administrative enforcement, but criminal enforcement took more 
time. It also required more resources, which were not available in the budget allocated to 
environmental management (Tal et al., 2010). Each of these sources reference the apparent trade-
off between economic growth and sustainability, but few connect it to the mentality of the 
general populations, which I find to be a significant component of the effectiveness of 
enforcement in environmental management in my research. 
Issues in the Population 
Tal (2002) discusses the origins of respect for land and resources in Jewish and Israeli 
culture. He notes, however, that the deep Jewish connection to water has often been surpassed by 
greed. Water was a fundamental piece of Zionism, acting both as a commodity and ideology that 
allowed immigrants from Europe to change the Middle Eastern landscape into a green and 
fruitful land. This mentality produced both innovative water projects and an unrealistic water-
dependency that could not be sustained in Israel’s climate but that has since remained the 
cultural norm, shaping the country’s foreign and defense policy (Tal, 2002). This mentality has 
made it difficult to make the necessary shift to an environmentally conscious society, thus posing 
a strain on the Israeli and neighboring environments. This challenge also points toward the 
second main reason for environmental management issues in the region: population mentality 
(Al-Khateeb et al., 2017; El-Hamouz, 2008; Hukkinen, 1998; Tal, 2002). 
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         El-Hamouz (2008) and Saadeh et al. (2019) explain the importance of the general 
population in waste management practices because without individual action, waste management 
is not possible. Both papers note the lack of enthusiasm in the population, however, especially in 
terms of financial contributions and simple efficiency. Al-Khateeb et al.’s (2017) study of 
attitudes concerning waste management also indicate predominantly negative perceptions of the 
waste management services and their effectiveness. El-Hamouz found that the Tubas district had 
a 10% community satisfaction with its municipal waste system, which left many people with the 
responsibility of walking their waste to a collection facility. As a result, 74.1% of these 
households decided to burn their waste (El-Hamouz 2008). 
This lack of awareness of proper environmental management actions and poor 
accessibility to environmental management systems is even present in higher education in the 
West Bank, as indicated by Al-Khatib et al.’s (2018) study. According to their study on solid 
waste management trends in higher education institutions, only 25% of higher education 
institutions in the West Bank implement programs aimed at raising awareness on solid waste 
management, and many of the universities separate and manage their waste poorly (Al-Khatib et 
al., 2018). Its findings reflect the society’s mentality toward waste management, also seen in the 
resulting poor water quality found in Ghanem et al.’s (2019) study on water quality in Palestine’s 
Natuv catchment. These studies reveal the popular mentalities and, in most cases, their 
immediate consequences, but I will consider these within the larger context of both Israel and the 
West Bank and their potential work together. 
Environmental Management Collaboration 
         According to the literature on environmental management initiatives, attitudes of the 
public play a large role in determining the success of environmental management and 
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collaboration. While people in the West Bank face more blatant and severe consequences of poor 
environmental management, Israel also has pollution but comes from a place of comfort and 
plenty in terms of water (Giordano, 2018; Wolf, 1995). Israel has historically faced water 
scarcity, but because of its strong economy and infrastructure, it has rapidly developed 
innovative solutions to water scarcity, including waste-water recycling and desalination 
(Giordano, 2018). The literature points to the complacency that this innovation has produced, 
and Wolf (1995) notes that states in a better hydrostrategic position will be less interested in 
water-sharing agreements. Giordano (2018), however, points out that the solutions Israel has 
found crave large amounts of energy, which may become unsustainable, and that is a weakness 
that its neighbors may be able to leverage to reach a water and energy-sharing agreement. 
        The literature explains several necessary components for managing the environment and 
its natural resources. The rapid consumption and focus on human development noted in Wolf 
(1995), Tal (2002), and Giordano’s (2018) is an example of the Tragedy of the Commons, a 
concept developed by Garrett Hardin in 1968. Hardin claims that individuals are driven by short-
term interests on an individual level. They will therefore inevitably degrade their shared natural 
resource. Hardin asserts that the only way to prevent this degradation is through socialization 
(government ownership) or privatization (Ostrom et al., 1999). Elinor Ostrom contested this 
theory in the 1990s, however, based on observations of communities sustainably managing their 
environmental resources on their own; governments and privatization do not always result in 
sustainable environmental management, and communities can develop systems for sustainable 
management as well (Ostrom et al., 1999). 
Ostrom developed a framework for collaboration on common pool resources based on 
these observations. The framework emphasizes the necessity for users to understand how 
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sustainable natural resource use will benefit them and their responsibility in contributing to this 
sustainable management (Ostrom et al., 1999). Other work on environmental management 
collaboration also supports this claim. Wondolleck and Yaffee (2000), for example, note that 
collaboration in environmental management is more likely to happen when there is a shared 
sense of place and responsibility to take care of that place combined with recognition of shared 
problems as well as goals or interests (Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000). Neither of these works is 
directly about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and they do not provide methods for managing the 
environment of conflict zones. They do, nonetheless provide a sound foundation for 
collaboration on environmental management, and I will build on these ideas by applying them to 
the situation in Israel and the West Bank. 
Wolf (1995) does consider the potential for collaboration around water sources in Israel 
and the West Bank. He highlights the importance of equity in control and information sharing, 
which has been an issue throughout the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly during the Israeli 
occupation (Wolf 1995). Opening up space both physically and politically to discuss these issues 
on equal grounds, as Wondolleck and Yaffee (2017) suggest in their more recent work, is thus an 
essential step toward mobilizing people and institutions. Wolf notes the limited success of the 
“Picnic Table talks” between Jordan and Israel concerning day-to-day operations, which reduced 
minor tensions. While Wolf (1995) suggests that small doable steps such as these talks will lead 
the way to water stability, Giordano (2018) examines EcoPeace’s proposal to create 
interdependence for water and energy between Israel, the West Bank, and Jordan. These two 
sources focus on the issues of water scarcity and water quality, and I will add to this conversation 
by considering waste management in this light as well, drawing on the suggestions for private-
Schneider 18 
public partnerships as well as environmental initiative collaborations and the formation of 
interdependence to ensure a more stable region.  
Methodology and Design 
In this study, I use a comparative methodology to answer the research question: How do 
environmental management institutions associated with water quality, water scarcity, and waste 
management in Israel compare to those in the West Bank? More specifically, what is similar, and 
what is different? Why do they lead to differing environmental management practices and 
outcomes? What constrains their ability to adopt a more cooperative approach to management of 
their shared environment? 
I first outline the two territories’ individual institutional environmental management 
systems by drawing on legislation and independent, NGO, and IGO studies assessing their 
effectiveness. The Israeli legislation is primarily implemented by the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection because it is the ministry specifically designed for environmental management, 
although other ministries are also involved in environmental policy. Their website includes a 
description of all of their laws and amendments in English, making it accessible and detailed 
enough to use for this study. The website has not been updated since 2012, however, leaving 
some of the legislation out of date. Nevertheless, the information available still allows for 
interpretation of legislative patterns over time and the history of environmental legislation in 
Israel. Additionally, the ministry’s summary and website are the most accessible resources 
concerning environmental legislation in Israel due to language and regional access barriers. I 
face similar difficulties with information about the West Bank. However, since the Palestinian 
National Authority provides more updated evaluations and revisions of their own legislation and 
governmental structure than does Israel, the sources for legislation and government information 
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are more updated. They also publish self-reports about every three years, evaluating 
environmental management in the region, which can be compared to third-party evaluations for 
accuracy and expanded perspectives. 
I also use independent studies because of their critique and assessments of the 
environmental management system in Israel; they are not controlled by PR or directly connected 
to political parties and are thus less likely to be politically influenced, unlike some government 
reports. I use NGO reports from EcoPeace and IGOs such as the World Bank and United Nations 
for similar reasons in both the sections on Israel and the West Bank. In the case of the West 
Bank, the third-party organizations often provide support and donations to environmental 
management and therefore have an interest in candid information concerning the environmental 
management situation in the region. These studies are thus highly useful and, especially when 
compared to each other and the PNA’s self-evaluations, seem reliable. Additionally, as a third-
party, they do not necessarily have a political stake in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and can 
therefore point out the power asymmetries and challenges posed by the occupation for either 
side. 
Overview 
In Chapters 2 and 3, I outline the environmental management institutions and their 
effectiveness in each of the territories. Chapter 2 focuses on Israel’s management based on its 
laws and independent studies on its environmental management structure and its effectiveness. In 
this chapter, I find that the Israeli population has historically supported unsustainable 
management of the environment, thus producing inadequate environmental management 
institutions and legal frameworks. Therefore, despite recent changes in public opinion, Israel still 
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faces significant environmental management challenges which threaten its own population and 
natural environment’s health. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the West Bank, drawing on its laws and IGO, NGO, and 
independent reports on its environmental management. In this chapter, I find that the West 
Bank’s waste and water management systems are highly decentralized, leaving most of the 
services in the hands of local authorities. This decentralization allows individual municipalities 
to respond to local events but also results in large quality gaps between municipalities. The 
environmental laws do regulate certain behaviors and specify punishments for violations, but 
most of the legal framework focuses on delegation and includes few specific requirements. This 
delegation to the local municipalities has resulted in large variations in the quality of 
management across the territory, depending on funds, infrastructure, resources, and independent 
decisions made by the local authorities.  
In Chapter 4, I compare the environmental management structures of Israel and the West 
Bank outlined in Chapters 2 and 3. First, I compare the policy implementation structure, 
followed by the legal framework, and then enforcement policies and practices. The final section 
of this chapter focuses on the political context of the environmental management institutions of 
each of these territories. This comparison reveals that Israel and the West Bank both face limited 
resources for environmental management but for different reasons. Israel has superior 
infrastructure and substantive legislation detailing management procedures, but there is a 
disconnect between the contemporary popular support for sustainable environmental 
management and Israel’s institutional framework. This institution perpetuates Israel’s historical 
lack of political support for sufficient funding and enforcement resources for environmental 
management and protection. The West Bank lacks basic infrastructure, funding, and manpower 
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in addition to facing practical challenges and resource restrictions imposed by the occupation. Its 
municipalities also have less guidance from the legislation and little ability to enforce the 
existing laws, resulting in little confidence on the part of the public and thus less participation in 
proper waste and water management. 
Finally, in Chapter 5, I evaluate the conclusions of Chapter 4 by using Ostrom’s 
environmental collaborative framework, which focuses on community initiatives within a larger 
support network. I use this discussion to consider waste and water management in the context of 
potential future collaboration between Israel and the West Bank. Ostrom’s and other 
environmental collaboration frameworks establish foundations for successful collaboration, 
including sense of community, responsibility surrounding a shared resource, and community 
engagement, all of which are impeded by the current manifestation of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. Nonetheless, both sides recognize the growing importance of proper water and waste 
management, an acknowledgment that could lead to a new environmental agreement and 
collaboration. As I find in my research, although Israel’s environmental management is more 
developed than that of the West Bank in terms of technology and precise legislation, both face 
enforcement challenges that jeopardize each other’s and their own environmental and public 
health. These common problems can become the foundation for an agreement leading to 
sustainable water and waste management in the region and potentially increased political 
stability. 
With the continued exacerbation of climate change, conflicts will continue to rise over 
resources and land. If today’s global patterns continue, the disparities between the Global North 
and the Global South will continue to grow, though both will ultimately be impacted by each 
other’s waste and environmental mismanagement. Thus, Israel and the West Bank provide an 
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opportunity to compare the environmental management of a state of the Global North and one of 
the Global South and their mutual impacts on each other and their environment. Their experience 
may give insight into potential approaches on global and local scales across the world as 




Israel’s Environmental Management 
Introduction 
Situated in one of the driest parts of the world, Israel finds itself in a precarious 
environmental situation (Phillipe Marin et al., 2017). Historically, Israel’s government has a 
tradition of prioritizing its population’s needs and consumption ahead of environmental health. 
Despite an emerging trend among the public toward environmental protection, the country’s 
institutions and legislation do not reflect this shift. Israel experiences problems of institutional 
stagnancy created by precedent and problematic frameworks, which is at odds with shifts in the 
general public. 
Israel drew on its environmental resources freely as it became a state, using large 
quantities of water, in particular (Tal, 2002). This mentality of environmental domination rather 
than preservation or conservation was built into the framework of Israel’s environmental 
management institutions; environmental management and protection was not prioritized in 
Israel’s governing institutions. Both historically and currently, implementation of environmental 
management legislation is distributed across Israel’s ministries, requiring efficient 
communication and coordination between departments for effective management and 
enforcement (Tal et al., 2010; Tal, 2002). This distribution of power leaves the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection, whose main objective is public and environmental health, with little 
independent influence to achieve its goal. 
The popular activism and legislation of the past three decades, however, indicates a shift 
in the general public toward growing concern for responsible waste and water management. The 
number of non-governmental environmental actors has drastically increased, and participation in 
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local environmental management has improved environmental quality (Tal, 2002; Yerushalmi, 
n.d.). Nonetheless, the lack of a strong environmental tradition, particularly in institutional 
frameworks, remains a constant issue in Israel’s environmental management system and its 
effectiveness. The Israeli government’s environmental management was originally informed by 
trends in the general public focused on consumption rather than sustainable management; Israel 
initially faced the first of the two main environmental management problems discussed in the 
literature: attitudes among the general public (El-Hamouz, 2008; Hukkinen, 1998; Tal, 2002; 
Wolf, 1995). This problem, however, created and exacerbated the other as well: lack of resources 
and efficiency in institutions. 
The original prioritization of economic and human development rather than 
environmental protection influenced the government’s allocation of resources and environmental 
management framework. Therefore, even after the shift in public opinion in favor of 
environmental protection, the institutional and legal framework for environmental management 
remains a barrier to effective environmental management. This chapter will outline the Israeli 
government’s environmental management actors and their roles, followed by a summary of 
relevant legislation concerning waste management, water quality, and water scarcity. After these 
sections, I discuss the challenges the environmental management system faces and, finally, how 
the Israeli population is trying to set a new status quo for environmental management and how 
the recent changes in water management may be an example to follow. 
Government Actors and Roles 
Israel’s government consists of twenty-two ministries, each with its own area of 
governing and legislative responsibilities (Choshen & Laster, 2005). These responsibilities 
sometimes overlap, so some laws are under the authority of more than one ministry, requiring 
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efficient communication and coordination within the government. Because environmental 
management covers a broad range of issues, most ministries are involved in the laws concerning 
environmental management in some form (Choshen & Laster, 2005). The Ministry of 
Environmental Protection is, however, nominally the main environmental actor of the Israeli 
government. It is “responsible for the formulation of a nationwide, integrated, and inclusive 
policy for the protection of the environment” (About Us Home, 2012). The ministry works at 
three levels to achieve this goal: national, regional, and local. The representatives at the national 
level are responsible for developing policy, strategies, standards, and priorities for environmental 
protection. The regional districts are responsible for the implementation of these national policies 
(Tal et al., 2010). The Ministry of Environmental Protection uses the same six geographical 
districts as the Interior Ministry, which is also heavily involved in environmental policy 
(Choshen & Laster 2005). These districts are Central, Jerusalem, Northern, Haifa, Tel Aviv, and 
Southern, shown in Figure 2.1. The district of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) is also 
considered a district of Israel, but it is not under civilian law. Therefore, the same laws do not 
apply (About Us Home, 2012). Finally, the local level includes fifty-two unit and town 
associations, also referred to as corporations, which advise local authorities and provide services 
for 85% of the Israeli population (About Us Home, 2012; The Israel Water Authority, 2012). 
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Figure 2.1: The Districts of Israel 
 
(Israel Districts Map, 2020)  
The Israel Water Authority also works with these fifty-two corporations on water 
management and distribution in Israel. These municipal corporations are responsible for the 
distribution of water, sewage collection, and wastewater treatment, but the Water Authority is the 
primary authority on water management in Israel, as it is in charge of planning, allocation, and 
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tariff regulations. Other entities also contribute to water management, however, including the 
government-owned company, Mekorot. Mekorot Water Company functions as the national bulk 
water provider. It provides 85% of Israel’s domestic potable water and 70% of Israel’s total 
water consumed (Phillipe Marin et al., 2017). Several ministries including the ministries of 
Environmental Protection, Interior, Agriculture, Health, and Finance are also involved in setting 
guidelines for water management implemented by these actors through policies and legislation 
(Phillipe Marin et al., 2017). 
Legislation 
The Ministry of Environmental Protection was not formed until 1988, but laws, bylaws, 
regulations, and administrative orders concerning environmental management have been in place 
in Israel since 1940 (Homolka et al., 2017). The legislation has since been revised, 
supplemented, and divided among the appropriate ministries. It primarily assigns the 
responsibilities of ministries, local authorities, and individual actors concerning environmental 
management. The legislation both targets specific environmental issues such as point-source 
pollution and provides comprehensive laws which create frameworks for resource and land use. 
This section will explore the main laws concerning water and waste management, listed in Table 
2.1, which are mostly under the authority of the Ministry of Environmental Protection and 




Table 2.1: Israel Environmental Management Laws 
Law Year of Enactment 
Water Law 1959 
Abatement of Nuisance Law 1961 
Local Authorities Sewage Law 1962 
Streams and Springs Authorities Law 1965 
Licensing of Business Law 1968 
Maintenance and Cleanliness Law 1989 
Prevention of Environmental Nuisances (Civil Action) Law 1992 
Collection of Disposal of Waste for Recycling Law 1993 
Freedom of Information Law 1998 
Municipal Water and Sewage Incorporation Law 2001 
Sewage Effluents Quality Standards and Sewage Treatment Rules 2010 
Packaging Law 2011 
Electrical and Electronic Equipment and Batteries Law 2012 
Sanitary Quality of Drinking Water Law 2013 
 
Waste Management Legislation 
The Ministry of Environmental Protection and local authorities are responsible for 
preventing and eliminating “nuisances,” which include air pollution, odors, and unsanitary 
conditions, all of which affect water quality and are potential results of poor waste management 
(Waste and Recycling, 2012). The Ministry therefore oversees many laws that regulate the 
management and disposal of waste, outlining proper disposal, prohibitions, and locations for 
disposal. 
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The “Maintenance and Cleanliness Law,” written in 1984 and updated as recently as 
2011, establishes expectations for waste management by authorities and individuals. It directly 
prohibits littering or waste disposal in the public domain and mandates that local authorities 
establish and publicize sites for the “disposal or collection, and treatment of construction and 
demolition debris, yard waste, tires, and vehicle scraps” (Waste and Recycling, 2012). To 
encourage compliance with the law, it defines severe fees and imprisonment sentences, requiring 
up to three years imprisonment or a fine of 404,000 NIS (New Israeli Shekel) for individuals and 
double for a corporation (Waste and Recycling, 2012). This law also establishes a fund, the 
Cleanliness Maintenance Fund, to which all fines are paid to ensure the violators contribute to 
amends. In 2007, Israel amended the law to include a levy for every ton of waste dumped into a 
landfill to be paid by the landfill operators to the Cleanliness Maintenance Fund. Importers and 
manufacturers of common litter are also charged levies for their products. These levies are part 
of an effort to internalize the costs of waste treatment and disposal as well as increase recycling 
and recovery (Waste and Recycling, 2012). 
The “Collection and Disposal of Waste for Recycling Law” focuses on recycling. “When 
required by the Minister of Environmental Protection,” local authorities are obligated to allocate 
and install recycling center sites, facilities, and containers (Waste and Recycling, 2012). The law 
also requires all businesses and homeowners to install and maintain recycling receptacles “within 
a municipality which operates recycling centers” (Waste and Recycling, 2012). It gives 
municipalities the authority to specify recycling procedures through bylaws but specifies that 
waste must be separated at the source. The law also set recycling goals when it was created in 
1993; by December 1998 the goal was to recycle 10% of Israel’s waste, 15% by 2000, and 25% 
by 2007 (Waste and Recycling, 2012). These standards have, however, been revised downward 
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as Israel has struggled to reach them in the past two decades. The recycling rate stood at 21% in 
2019 (Lidman, 2018). Other laws specify the disposal and recycling of specific materials such as 
construction and demolition debris, tires, and electrical and electronic equipment, but they have 
been passed more recently (since 2000) than the collection laws establishing waste management 
frameworks discussed above (Waste and Recycling, 2012). Both the amendments and new laws 
share the goals with which the Ministry of Environmental Protection is tasked: to reduce waste 
and environmental effects that could damage public health and the environment (About Us 
Home, 2012). 
Water Management Legislation 
The main legislation regulating water sources and use in Israel is the “Water Law.” The 
government established the law in 1959 and has regularly updated and expanded it since then 
(Water and Wastewater, 2012). The law establishes a framework for the control and protection 
of Israel’s water sources, designating this framework as the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Ministry of Infrastructure, the Water Commissioner (now replaced by the Water 
Authority), and the Ministry of Environmental Protection. 
Fundamentally, this law designates “all sources of water in Israel as public property,” 
giving every person entitlement to the water, “as long as that use does not cause the salination or 
depletion of the water resource” (Water and Wastewater, 2012). Much of the remaining sections 
of the law specify “salination or depletion” by designating limits on chemicals, contaminants, 
sewage, and other pollution that can be disposed of into water sources or other areas of the 
environment that may affect water sources. The law directly outlaws “any act which directly or 
indirectly causes, or may cause, immediate or subsequent water pollution” (Water and 
Wastewater, 2012). It specifies regulations for industries regarding chemical substances for 
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agriculture, sludge, wastewater, and cesspools for factories, pipeline and gas station regulation 
for the oil industry (Water and Wastewater, 2012). 
The “Water Law” also deals with sewage, detailing maximum levels for chemicals and 
substances allowed to be exposed to sewage, a bar that was raised in 1992. The “Local 
Authorities Sewage Law” established the role of local authorities concerning sewage systems in 
1962; each local authority is required to maintain a sewage system in proper condition, which 
must be approved by the regional planning commission and health and environment authorities. 
In 2001, the Municipal Water and Sewage Incorporation Law was enacted to promote 
“agglomeration of services into regional utilities,” centralizing the country’s sewage 
management. Public health regulations such as the “Sewage Effluents Quality Standards and 
Sewage Treatment Rules” and “Sanitary Quality of Drinking Water Law” set the standards for 
reused sewage effluents and drinking water (Phillipe Marin et al., 2017).  
These laws also address industrial sewage; the “Local Authorities Sewage Law” proposes 
recommendations for sewage maintenance including treatment and disposal of industrial sewage, 
though it prohibits industrial plant sewage from being discharged into regular sewage systems. 
Industrial sewage must instead follow the 3-stage cascade rinsing process outlined in the “Water 
Law” (Water and Wastewater, 2012). There is also a tariff charged for industrial sewage; the 
Sewage Law sets this tariff and other charges and fees for sewage systems across the state 
(Water and Wastewater, 2012). 
In the case that these laws fail to protect one of Israel’s water sources, the Minister of 
Environmental Protection has the power to enact the “Streams and Springs Authorities Law.” 
This law allows the Ministry of the Environment to establish an authority for a particular water 
source with permission from local authorities and the Ministry of Interior. The water source 
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authority can then instate extra fees, licenses, and regulations to improve the condition of the 
water source. The Streams and Springs Authorities Law was enacted in 1988 for the Yarkon 
River Authority and the Kishon River Authority in 1994, both of which were established to 
diminish pollution in the rivers caused primarily by industrial activities (Water and Wastewater, 
2012). 
Penalties and Enforcement 
 The government as well as the people have the power to initiate official action to order 
people and other actors to remove environmental nuisances and pollution. Laws such as the 
“Abatement of Nuisances Law,” “Maintenance and Cleanliness Law,” and “Prevention of 
Environmental Nuisances Law” permit the Ministry of Environmental Protection to mandate 
action and take necessary measures in case of failure to comply (Waste and Recycling, 2012). 
The Ministry of Environmental Protection is the main actor in charge of environmental 
compliance, although ministries such as those of interior, health, and infrastructure also have 
some influence (Tal et al., 2010). Local municipalities are also involved in compliance, primarily 
through business licensing, response to local nuisances, and public education (Tal et al., 2010). 
Israel has two methods of environmental policy enforcement: administrative and criminal. In 
Israel, the administrative method relies on six regional offices, one in each of the districts 
previously mentioned, which oversee the distribution of permits, monitoring, advising, and 
public education. In the case of an environmental nuisance complaint, they first issue letters of 
warning followed by a hearing. If these methods are unsuccessful, however, the case goes to the 
Green Police (Tal et al., 2010). 
The Green Police are one of two departments in the Ministry of Environmental Protection 
in charge of criminal enforcement. The other department is the legal department, composed of 
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attorneys who take cases to court once they pass out of the hands of the Green Police (Tal et al., 
2010). The Green Police work at the national, regional, and local level to enforce environmental 
laws and address complaints for a set list of environmental issues, including waste waterflow, 
sewage, hazardous substances, and handling complaints (Enforcement Methods, 2016). Despite 
this wide range of responsibility, as of 2010, the Green Police was composed of about forty 
inspectors with limited powers to arrest, interrogate, and issue penalties as well as document 
environmental nuisances. As of 2011, they are allowed to open investigations and remain 
working on a case until it is prepared for indictment (Enforcement Methods, 2016). The first 
nationwide Green Police operation took place in 2016. It inspected 245 sites for “illegal sources 
of air pollution, underground water contamination, and hazardous materials offenses” and issued 
34 fines (First Nationwide Green Police Enforcement Operation, 2016). The operation involved 
the combined manpower of the Green Police, Israeli Police officers, and “workers from the 
MoEP [Ministry of Environmental Protection] and environmental units” to have 150 people 
work on the operation (First Nationwide Green Police Enforcement Operation, 2016). Although 
this team appears to have carried through an effective operation, it had to draw from four groups 
to get 150 people to work on an operation meant to cover the whole country, serving as a 
testament to the small amount of manpower Israeli environmental law enforcement have. 
Israeli environmental law penalties are based on a polluter-pays policy, meaning that the 
violator pays for the damages caused, often with an additional penalty. The penalties involve 
either imprisonment or payment based on the crime. The laws set upper limits on imprisonment 
time and fines, so the penalty can be applied according to the severity of the crime. The upper 
limits for improper disposal, collection, and treatment of “construction and demolition debris, 
yard waste, tires, and vehicle scraps,” for example, is up to three years imprisonment or a fine of 
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404,000 New Israeli Shekel (117,023 USD) (Waste and Recycling, 2012). Additionally, the court 
may seize the vehicle used to illegally dispose of the waste, and it is required to do so if the 
violator repeats this offense within three years. The law also specifies that penalties are doubled 
for corporations. The penalties for this law are among the harshest penalties for violating waste 
and water management laws in Israel (Waste and Recycling, 2012). Regardless of these penalties 
and Israel’s enforcement mechanisms, Israel still faces environmental management issues 
stemming both from violations and the institutional framework (Lidman 2018; Tal et al., 2010).  
Challenges 
 Despite Israel’s comprehensive collection of waste and water management legislation, it 
still struggles with environmental issues such as pollution, water scarcity, and waste disposal 
(Kalifa, 2019; Lidman, 2018; Tal et al., 2010). Its recycling levels remain at 21% despite goals 
made in 1998 to reach 25% by 2007, leaving Israel with the lowest recycling rates among the 
developed countries (Lidman, 2018; Waste and Recycling, 2012). Israel’s waste production also 
increased at a 2% annual rate from 2013-2016, with average waste per capita at 1.7kg per person 
per year in 2019, which is higher than the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development average and falls just under the United States average of 2kg per person per day 
(Lidman, 2018). As the laws outline above, this waste is legally required to be safely collected 
and disposed of at approved facilities (Waste and Recycling, 2012). Israel’s waste does not 
always end up in properly regulated landfills or “waste-to-energy” facilities, however. Often 
waste producers and collectors illegally dump the waste, either in nature, which is protected as 
“the public domain,” or it is transported to places like the West Bank where people sort through 
and burn the trash (Kalifa, 2019; Lidman, 2018). These types of unregulated and illegal disposal 
feed into the issues of water quality and water scarcity because the waste pollutes water sources, 
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making them dangerous for human consumption and destroying ecosystems. This type of water 
contamination led to the closing of 282 wells between 2000 and 2010 because of pollution 
concentrations in Israel’s coastal aquifer (Tal et al., 2010). 
 The compliance difficulties with environmental laws in Israel may be attributed to the 
country’s historical lack of environmental management prioritization. As several scholars point 
out, two main factors causing poor environmental management are trends among the public and 
lack of resources and efficiency in institutions (El-Hamouz, 2008; Hukkinen, 1998; Tal, 2002; 
Wolf, 1995). Both of these issues appear in Israel’s environmental management scene. Although 
the environment, particularly water, was an important part of Zionism, greed has often fueled the 
country’s treatment of water; Israel’s pioneers used its water with the aim of replicating a lush 
European aesthetic in the Middle East. “The original political focus on water both produced 
innovative water projects and developed an unrealistic water-dependency that could not be 
sustained in Israel’s climate” (Tal, 2002). The mentality of the people was more focused on 
using the resources than protecting them, and the government, a republic meant to reflect the 
opinions of the people, followed trends in public opinion. Thus, the first main factor of 
environmental management, trends in the general public, shaped the government’s approach to 
environmental management and produced the second factor: lack of resources and efficiency in 
environmental management institutions. 
Although Israel had laws regulating the use of resources such as water since the late 
1940s, they were spread across the ministries without a common goal of environmental 
protection. Instead, they served the purposes of other ministries such as maximizing agriculture 
or strategic defense uses in the region (Tal, 2002). In 1973, the Environmental Protection Service 
was established within the Ministry of Interior in an attempt to “create a comprehensive and 
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modern environmental administration” (About Us Home, 2012). The EPS was, however, poorly 
funded, and environmental management and protection remained a subsection of a ministry (Tal, 
2002). It was not until 1988 that this field had its own ministry, and even then, it was only 
created because of a political “fluke” (Tal, 2002). The government faced a political stalemate in 
the dead-even 1988 election in which the ministers outnumbered Israel’s ministries by one, so 
the government formed a new ministry: The Ministry of the Environment (now known as the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection). Even after its formation, however, the new government 
office faced many obstacles in its path to protecting and managing the environment, including 
lack of prestige, poor financing, and limited actual control. 
The Ministry of Environmental Protection started out with a budget of 0.018% of the 
government’s overall budget, and this number has remained low (Tal, 2002). As of 2005, the 
budget was still merely 0.1% of the total budget, significantly lower than the allotment to most 
ministries (Choshen & Laster, 2005). The poor funding and enthusiasm for the ministry has not 
been divided among political lines; it has simply been guided by the status quo, which has come 
from a history of poor environmental management, consistently resulting in poor sewage 
management and contaminated drinking water (Tal, 2002). Due to this status quo, the position of 
Minister for Environmental Protection has been vacated and filled frequently, as politicians have 
moved on to more prestigious positions, using the Ministry of Environmental Protection as a 
steppingstone rather than investing in and advocating for it (Tal, 2002). 
The ministry’s weak reputation has also made it difficult to gain actual political power. 
After its foundation, it had to fight other ministries to expand its scope and jurisdiction (Tal, 
2002). The Environmental Protection Service, originally under the Ministry of Interior, became 
the foundation of the new ministry and was slowly built upon by additions from other ministries. 
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The Ministry of Agriculture gave up the National Parks Authority to the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection, but it kept the Nature Reserve system and Water Commission, 
maintaining direct control over pesticide registration and oversight policies. The new ministry 
also took over the Licensing of Businesses Law from the Ministry of Health, along with power 




Table 2.2: Division of Environmental Laws Among Israeli Ministries as of 2005 
(based on data from Choshen and Laster’s 2005 report) 
Ministry/Government 
Entity 
Number of environmental laws over which the ministry 
has authority (shared and exclusive authority) 
Interior 52 





Environmental Protection 33 
Finance 24 
Industry and Trade 20 
National Infrastructure 19 
Education 19 
Labor and Welfare 15 
Construction and Housing 13 
Tourism 11 
Water Authority 9 
Prime Minister’s Office 1 
 
Despite these expansions of the new ministry’s powers, it was condemned to the role of 
“supporting actor” concerning key environmental issues by other ministries that wanted to 
maintain control, a role that the ministry often continues to occupy today (Tal, 2002). The 
Ministry of Environmental Protection ranks fifth among the ministries in the number of 
environmental laws under its control and is involved in under 10% of the country’s 
environmental laws (see Table 2.2 for the number of environmental laws under each ministry) 
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(Choshen & Laster, 2005). The Ministry of Interior has the greatest number of environmental 
laws under its authority, and this number has increased since 1988 despite the government’s 
official statement: “all of the Ministry of Interior’s activity related to environmental protection 
will be transferred to the Ministry of Environment” (Choshen & Laster, 2005). Other ministries 
managing environmental legislation related to water quality, water scarcity, and waste 
management include the ministries of health, agriculture and rural development, transportation, 
industry and trade, and national infrastructure (Choshen & Laster, 2005; Tal et al., 2010). As 
mentioned previously, the laws are also often under the authority of more than one of these 
entities. Thus, the Ministry of Environmental Protection has exclusive authority over less 
environmental management than its thirty-three environmental laws imply (Choshen & Laster, 
2005). 
This system also requires cooperation and communication across ministries to enforce, 
change, and sometimes create new laws. The process becomes an issue for three reasons: 
bureaucratic complications within the government; the reputation of the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection; lack of historical prioritization of environmental management 
legislation (Choshen & Laster, 2005; Tal, 2002). The ministry’s background gives it little 
prestige from all political sides as the office is not divided along political lines. Both insufficient 
financing and the ministry’s reputation limit its capabilities and have resulted in poor 
environmental management such as the poisoning of Israel’s largest source of drinking water, 
which took two years to clean up because the ministry lacked the power and support to stop it 
(Tal, 2002). The condition of the ministry in charge of environmental management is a testament 
to the poor reputation of environmental management among both politicians and constituents in 
Israeli history. 
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Increasing Pressures for Change 
 Despite the historical disregard for environmental management in Israel, the past few 
decades have seen a change in attitude among the people and increase in environmental 
legislation, including a total reformation of the water sector. Throughout the 1990s, Israelis 
began to take actions to properly manage their environment themselves. The decade saw an 80% 
increase in the number of environmental organizations in Israel, a number that continued to grow 
after 2000 (Tal, 2002). Funding for these organizations also grew into the early 2000s; in 1996, 
less than 20% of the organizations reported budgets over $30,000, but by 2000, 28% had budgets 
over $100,000. The non-profit NGO, the Israeli Union of Environmental NGOs, Life and 
Environment (also known as L&E) had nearly eighty member organizations by 2000. As of 2019 
it represents and serves over 120 environmental organizations by fostering cooperation and 
professional aid (Yerushalmi, n.d.). Organizations like Life and Environment have facilitated the 
rapid expansion of grassroots environmental movements across Israel as well as encouraged 
legislative changes, which have given the public increasing power in the realm of environmental 
management. 
The government has given citizens increasing power in environmental management both 
in terms of reporting and accessing information concerning pollution and the environment (Tal, 
2002; Water and Wastewater, 2012). For example, the “Prevention of Environmental Nuisances 
Law” of 1992 gives citizens the ability to file environmental lawsuits against polluters on behalf 
of themselves or NGOs. They can demand restraining orders, prevention of recurrence orders, 
and corrective orders (Waste and Recycling, 2012). The “Freedom of Information Law” allows 
individuals and public organizations to request information from public authorities, and in 2005 
it was amended to expand the publication and accessibility of environmental information 
relevant to public health. This amendment was intended to make information accessible through 
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websites and other public means, reducing the need for application and request fees, thus 
reducing prices and barriers to information for both the public and the government (Homolka et 
al., 2017). 
The increased public participation and pressure from the 1990s environmental movement 
and increasing environmental constraints have also influenced legislative changes. As discussed 
above, many of the older laws pertaining to environmental management have been amended 
since the 1990s, and many of the laws concerning waste disposal, such as the “Electrical and 
Electronic Equipment and Batteries Law” and the “Packaging Law” were passed in the past 
fifteen years (Waste and Recycling, 2012). The most dramatic environmental management 
changes in the past twenty years, however, have been in water management. 
Israel experienced three major water crises going into the turn of the century, which 
“built gradual momentum for major reforms” (Phillipe Marin et al., 2017). The first crisis was a 
major drought in 1986, which led to a 15% reduction in agricultural water supply. The next 
significant drought was in 1989/90 and required “severe and unpopular water restrictions” 
(Phillipe Marin et al., 2017). It was, however, followed by an unusually rainy winter in 1991-92, 
so residents were able to forget the gravity of drought until 1998, which saw “severe water 
shortages and rationing in most Israeli cities” (Phillipe Marin et al., 2017). The culmination of 
this series of crises “provided a political window for action,” encouraged by the public and 
government (Phillipe Marin et al., 2017). In 2000, the Israeli government began remodeling the 
water sector through policy changes to water management, using a plan to gradually institute a 
sustainable framework for water management to guarantee water security for Israel (Phillipe 
Marin et al., 2017). 
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The reformation is significantly based on recommendations by the 2002 Parliamentary 
Investigation Committee of the Water Sector. It replaced the Water Commissioner with the Israel 
Water Authority in 2007, centralizing authority over water management of the whole country 
instead of having it spread across entities (Phillipe Marin et al., 2017). The committee 
recognized that too many entities were involved in managing the water sector, an assessment 
which may also be applied to waste management. The new framework centralized many of the 
decision-making processes involved in water management by outlining the responsibilities and 
reach of each entity involved in the water sector, designating the ministries, Water Authority, 
and Mekorot as being responsible at the national scale, municipal and regional water utilities 
(such as the fifty-two corporations) at the municipal or regional scale, and drainage and river 
authorities focusing on national basins (Phillipe Marin et al., 2017). 
Another notable result of the reformation of the water management sector is the crucial 
move toward self-financing. The government instituted nationwide tariffs, implemented 
institutional reforms, and encouraged partnerships with the private sector. These changes were 
made to gradually phase out direct budget subsidies for the water sector, a plan that has had 
substantial, though incomplete success (Phillipe Marin et al., 2017). 
The new sustainable management plan as well as changes in water management 
regulations and laws pushed Israel to find new ways of obtaining and recycling the precious 
resource. Many farms now use treated sewage to water plants; 87% of sewage generated in Israel 
is used in agriculture, where it can be safely recycled rather than polluting or simply being lost in 
the environment. The government has also recently turned to desalination as a solution for water 
scarcity, now drawing 85% of its drinking water from its five desalination plants (“Arid Middle 
East faces political battles over water shortfalls,” 2018). 
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Although the desalination plants have made costs of water drop significantly over the 
past decade, it still comes at great energy cost, and the Water Authority still warns people against 
wasting water (Lidman, 2018). Israel plans to pump desalinated water into its depleted sources of 
freshwater, but this demands lots of fossil fuel energy and can only benefit the state if people are 
still careful in their water use. Such measures highlight the importance of individual action, as 
noted in much of the legislation (“Arid Middle East faces political battles over water shortfalls,” 
2018). Additionally, the water management sector itself still needs to make significant 
improvements to be entirely sustainable and ensure water security. For example, although the 
self-funding of the water-sector has been successful in some ways, it has also led to economic 
inefficiencies in water resource allocation. Another major unsolved issue is the restrictions on 
aquifer abstraction and water allocation for the Palestinian population (Phillipe Marin et al., 
2017). 
Conclusion 
The Israeli government’s wide dispersal and sharing of environmental management 
policies and responsibilities across ministries requires the prioritization of cooperation and 
coordination across ministries for the legislation to be effective and enforced. For the legislation 
to function, the ministries also need effective and efficient communication between each other to 
reach agreements on enforcement and policies. Environmental management, however, has not 
historically been a priority for the Israeli government, so this coordination is generally lacking. 
Part of what made the reformation of the water sector successful was the minimization of this 
particular issue by centralizing national responsibilities and clearly outlining the duties of each 
entity. 
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Despite the cultural value of the land and water to the Jewish people, consumption has 
dominated the historical narrative of environmental management (Tal, 2002). This consumption 
mentality has led to the depletion and contamination of Israel’s few water sources, shared with 
its neighbors, thus negatively affecting both itself and surrounding populations such as 
Palestinians and Jordanians (Tal, 2002). This combination of disregard for environmental 
management and poor intragovernmental coordination heightens challenges at the transboundary 
level, particularly in light of research indicating water use as a primary cause for conflict and 
instability in the Middle East (Barnard & Wahab, 2018; Giordano, 2018; Homolka et al., 2017; 
Tal, 2002; Wolf, 1995). 
This issue is exacerbated by the financial burden it creates; as demonstrated by the 
history of the Ministry of Environmental Protection, environmental management and its primary 
ministry holds little prestige among politicians regardless of the population’s changing 
sentiments. In part due to this reputation and lack of political prestige, environmental 
management receives little financial support, exemplified by the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection’s budget, which lags behind most Western countries, impeding its power and 
enforcement capabilities (Choshen & Laster, 2005). Since its founding, the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection has grown, along with its budget, but the two remain small. 
Despite Israel’s legislative efforts and the actions of local and regional organizations, the 
lack of government efficiency and effectiveness both creates and prolongs the consequences of 
poor environmental management. While movements toward increased waste management 
accountability are reflected in legislation, actual enforcement is still a problem, the results of 
which can be seen in the poor water quality and low national recycling levels in Israel (Tal et al., 
2010). Poor general compliance with Israeli waste management policies can also be seen in the 
Schneider 45 
waste and pollution in the West Bank where e-waste from Israel is a major pollutant. Although 
Israel and the West Bank worked on an agreement to limit the flow of e-waste and properly 
dispose of hazardous waste, bureaucratic issues persisted, and still exist today (Kalifa, 2019). 
Thus, although Israel has a complex environmental management framework, it is not effective 
enough to maintain water security or high levels of environmental quality. The factors 
contributing to these inadequacies are: the complexity of the management framework, the 
internal cooperation the framework demands, a lack of funding and limited enforcement power, 





The West Bank’s Environmental Management 
Introduction 
 The West Bank’s environmental management system is highly decentralized, so the 
quality of management varies enormously across the different municipalities (Al-Khateeb et al. 
2017; Nour and Al-Saidi 2018). Even so, the same primary issues of inadequate infrastructure, 
management, and resources prevail throughout the entire territory (Ghunaim, 2016). The West 
Bank faces the environmental challenges that Israel and other growing populations of the Middle 
East face in addition to the challenges posed by the Israeli occupation, which limit mobility, 
resources, and institutional effectiveness (Ghunaim, 2016; Haavisto, 2003; Nour & Al-Saidi, 
2018). These limitations severely constrict the West Bank’s water and waste management 
operations and effectiveness, resulting in public health and environmental consequences 
(Ghunaim 2016; Haavisto 2003; Nour & Al-Saidi 2018; Ghanem et al., 2018). This chapter 
provides a brief overview of the Palestinian National Authority’s environmental management 
system and main actors with specific attention to water and waste management. It identifies the 
main problems faced by this system and its institutions based on internal strategy plans and third-
party studies. 
The Palestinian National Authority’s Environmental Management 
 The Palestinian National Authority (or PNA, formerly the Palestinian Authority) was 
established in May 1994 following the first round of Oslo Accords. These accords were talks 
between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the recognized representative of the 
Palestinian people at the time. The Palestinian National Authority was established as an interim 
governing body for the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank 
Schneider 47 
(Palestinian Authority: History and Overview, 2020). The authority was intended to increase its 
independence and power in five-year intervals to reach a point of domestic self-governance with 
a close security relationship to Israel (Palestinian territories—Timeline, 2019). The second 
intifada in the early 2000s and 2006 Palestinian election results made Israel feel threatened, 
which derailed the plan for the Palestinian National Authority’s power progression; the Gaza 
Strip has since been blockaded and most of the West Bank occupied (Palestinian territories—
Timeline, 2019). As a result, the power of the Palestinian National Authority applies in varying 
degrees to each of the territories. The West Bank is divided into three areas: A, B, and C (see 
Figure 1.3 for a map), each of which is under different jurisdictions and levels of occupation. 
The occupied territories of the West Bank are under Israeli martial law where Israeli 
environmental legislation applies only if a military order says so (Haavisto, 2003). Thus, the 
environmental laws of the current Palestinian National Authority are primarily enforced and 
applied in area A of the West Bank, which is what this chapter will focus on (Haavisto, 2003). 
Environmental management has been a persistent part of the Palestinian government 
since its foundation and continues to be a primary area of concern for the Palestinian National 
Authority and Palestinians. The governing bodies in charge of environmental management have 
changed several times since its foundation due to administerial changes in the rest of the 
government and, more recently, because of reform processes in attempts to increase 
environmental management effectiveness (Haavisto, 2003). In October of 1994, six months after 
its foundation, the Palestinian National Authority formed the Environmental Planning 
Directorate in the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, the first Palestinian 
environmental governing entity (Haavisto, 2003). The environmental governing body has 
changed three times since this initial form. First, in 1996, following Oslo II, the Palestinian 
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Environmental Authority was formed; in 1998, Presidential Decree No. 2 by Yasser Arafat 
created the Ministry for Environmental Affairs, and in 2002, Presidential Decree No. 6 made it 
an authority once again: the Environmental Quality Authority (Haavisto, 2003). 
 Similarly to Israel, the Palestinian environmental governing entity has changed hands and 
degrees of power many times, causing some confusion over the division of environmental 
responsibilities between ministries and difficulty enforcing policies. As in the Israeli 
government, environmental responsibilities are distributed across ministries and authorities in the 
PNA. The ministries and authorities involved in water and waste management include the 
Ministries of Local Government, Health, Industry, and Interior and the Palestinian Water 
Authority (Haavisto, 2003). Each of these entities is involved in executing, enforcing, and 
creating environmental management in a different way, but most of the practical responsibilities 
of water and waste management lie with the local municipalities themselves, resulting in varying 
quality of management across the territory (Ghunaim 2016; Haavisto 2003). 
Since 1995, Palestine has had a governing body specifically for water management: the 
Palestinian Water Authority (the PWA). The PWA’s responsibilities and powers have grown 
over time as the authority has become increasingly independent. In 2002, Water Act No. 3 put it 
in charge of managing the water sector, specifically the regulation of private and local 
government relationships (About PWA, 2017). More recently, the new Water Law of 2014 
restructured the West Bank’s water sector in an attempt to make it more efficient and sustainable 
(Nour & Al-Saidi, 2018). Even after the reformation, local authorities, particularly in rural areas, 
still bear large responsibilities for water management (Nour & Al-Saidi, 2018). 
The Palestinian environmental management structure means that waste management 
relies on local municipalities’ funds, which are inconsistent across the territory, so certain 
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municipalities may have much better waste management systems than others due to available 
funding. Additionally, those with poor management may cause environmental degradation, 
threatening not only their own area but also water sources and other natural resources used by 
other municipalities. The Ministry of Local Government is “involved in the operation and 
financing of solid waste collection and disposal,” but, in actuality, the municipalities and village 
councils are responsible for carrying out the collection, transport, and disposal of municipal 
wastes (El-Hamouz, 2008; Haavisto, 2003). In the municipalities, the Joint Service Councils 
(JSCs) are in charge of solid waste management, so the management differs between the 
municipalities depending on decisions made by individual JSCs, attitudes and size of the 
population, and funding available (El-Hamouz, 2008). Funding is necessary for adequate 
infrastructure, but poor infrastructure such as a lack of roads prevents waste services from 
reaching everywhere they are needed (Saadeh et al., 2019). Therefore, the quality of 
infrastructure is both a result of these factors and a contributing determinant of the success of the 
waste management systems. Other issues affected by the variation in these factors include water 
quality and thus environmental and public health. 
 Water management is also primarily controlled by the municipalities (Haavisto, 2003). In 
the early 2000s, many developing countries shifted toward “Integrated Water Resources 
Management” models, which focused on “the interdisciplinary and inter-sectoral nature of water 
issues” (Nour & Al-Saidi, 2018). Although the initiatives failed in many places due to 
fragmentation in the institutional structures, lack of resources, and poor coordination, the PNA 
also started a reform process in 2009, resulting in a National Water and Wastewater Strategy in 
2013 and a new water law in 2014 (Nour & Al-Saidi, 2018). These reforms attempted to bring in 
third-party analysis and monitoring to increase water service quality by incentivizing 
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effectiveness among local authorities with economic instruments and service standards. The new 
plan, however, still leaves local authorities with the responsibilities of supplying water and 
sanitation services. The water itself comes either from local wells or is bought through the West 
Bank Water Department from the Israeli government-owned company, Mekorot (Nour & Al-
Saidi, 2018). Israel, however, controls the amount of water Mekorot sells to Palestinians, and as 
a result many communities must buy additional water transported by truck at a much higher price 
(The Occupation of Water, 2017). The new water law established the National Water Company, 
a Palestinian-owned bulk water distributor, as a part of the water sector reformation. The 
National Water Company was intended to decrease Palestinian dependence on Israel’s water 
service, but due to errors in the reformation such as the neglect of rural areas and poor 
distribution of information, the development of the new company has taken a long time and has 
had little public support. Consequently, the West Bank still buys water from Mekorot (Nour & 
Al-Saidi, 2018; The Occupation of Water, 2017). 
The reformation of the water sector and the new water law attempt to establish several 
independent regulatory bodies under the PWA for different areas of water management. These 
bodies include the National Water Company mentioned above, the Water Sector Regulatory 
Council, Water Users Associations, and Regional Water Utilities (see Table 3.1 for a list). The 
PWA is itself responsible for a wide variety of areas, primarily at the administrative level to 
support sustainable water use. These responsibilities include surveying water resources, 
preparing policies, developing water quality standards, and protecting water resources (Water 
Law, 2014). It is funded by its allocated amount from the government’s budget, other grants, 
donations, loans, and fees for licenses and permits. It has the most sources of income of the 
regulatory bodies in the water sector. The Water Sector Regulatory Council is in charge of 
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monitoring production, transport, distribution, wastewater treatment, and supply agreements. Its 
funding comes from fees for licenses and grants, aid, and loans approved by the Palestinian 
Cabinet of Ministers (Water Law, 2014). The Water Users Associations are non-profit 
organizations that manage irrigation water supply at the local level and are financially 
independent, meaning they do not receive funding from the government (Water Law, 2014). 
Finally, the Regional Water Utilities are the “institutions and utilities which provide 
water and wastewater services directly to the consumer” (Water Law, 2014). They are 
responsible for providing water and wastewater services within their specified administrative and 
geographical scopes. They are “financially independent,” meaning that they must fund the water 
provision services independently from the PWA and fees collected from licenses and permits 
(Water Law, 2014). Thus, despite the reformation of the water sector, water distribution and 
sanitation are still left up to the system each municipality decides to employ, resulting in 




Table 3.1: Water Management Governing Bodies in the West Bank 
(Water Law, 2014) 
Governing Body Summarized Responsibilities Designated Funding 
Palestinian 
Water Authority 
- Preparing policies 
- Surveying available water resources 
- Protecting water resources 
- Develop standards for water quality 
- Establish monitoring systems 
- “Build institutional capacities for the 
management of shared water resource and 
deepen regional and international 
cooperation” 
State budget allocation; 
grants, loans, donations; fees 




- Approve water prices 
- Monitor operation processes 
- Monitor water supply agreements 
- Develop performance incentives for 
providers 
Fees for licenses; grants, aid, 
and loans approved by the 
Cabinet of Ministers 
National Water 
Company 
- Supply and sell bulk water to local 
distributors 
- Extract water 
- Provide for development of all activities 
and infrastructure related to supplying bulk 
water 




- Provide water and wastewater services to 









To mitigate drastic differences in waste and water management across the territory, the 
PWA helps provide “essential financial resources” with funds from donors “especially to the 
local authorities who were not able to get the funds needed for the development of 
infrastructure” (Ghunaim, 2016). This goal intentionally aims to overcome the fundamental 
hurdle of poor infrastructure, which easily distinguishes effective and ineffective waste and 
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water management. Another attempt to equalize the waste and water management systems across 
the country is written into the PNA’s main environmental legislation: the Palestinian 
Environmental Law, which states that the Ministry “in coordination with other specialized 
agencies” will set comprehensive plans for solid waste management and “standards and norms” 
for the treatment of water (Palestinian Environmental Law, 1999). If the national authority has a 
plan in place for how to go about waste and water management, the services provided across the 
territory should, in theory, be relatively uniform. 
Legislation 
 The main legislation governing environmental management and protection issues in the 
PNA is the Palestinian Environmental Law. Passed in 1999, this piece of legislation is a 
comprehensive law including ten chapters and eighty-two articles covering a wide variety of 
environmental management and protection issues (Haavisto, 2003; Palestinian Environmental 
Law, 1999). The law’s objective is to protect the environment, promote public health, and 
preserve biodiversity by “preventing all types of pollution.” The law aims to foster a sustainable 
approach to the environment “for the benefit of present and future generations on the basis of 
intergenerational equity” (Haavisto, 2003). The law is divided into five parts based on the 
contents of its chapters and their articles. The second section is titled “Environmental Protection” 
and includes five chapters, each of which have articles pertaining to a different environmental 
issue. Table 3.2 identifies the key sections and topics discussed in this chapter. 
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Table 3.2: Key Palestinian Environmental Management Law Sections & Articles 
Palestinian Environmental Law 
Section 
Articles Topic 
Section 2: Environmental Protection 7-10 Solid waste management 
Section 2 11-13 Hazardous waste 
Section 2 28-30 Water and the environment 
Section 5: Penalties 30 Illegal discharge of substances (article 13) 




The “Environmental Protection” section of the Palestinian Environmental Law covers a 
variety of issues including solid and hazardous waste. Articles seven through ten outline basic 
guidelines concerning Solid Waste Management, assigning responsibilities to the Ministry, often 
in coordination with “other specialized agencies” (Palestinian Environmental Law, 1999). These 
responsibilities entail setting comprehensive plans for solid waste management on the national 
level, including supervision of the implementation on local levels, and setting standards for solid 
waste disposal sites. The specialized agencies are also required to “encourage undertaking 
appropriate precautions to reduce the generation of solid waste to the lowest level possible” 
(Palestinian Environmental Law, 1999). The law specifically emphasizes reusing and recycling 
waste in order to reduce the amount of waste produced by Palestinian communities. Other than 
the requirement to “encourage” waste reduction precautions, these articles on solid waste do not 
specify how the waste should be managed, though regulations on solid waste do appear in other 
articles when there is overlap (such as water regulations). Instead, these articles simply delegate 
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the responsibilities among the Ministry and other “specialized agencies” (Palestinian 
Environmental Law, 1999). 
Articles eleven through thirteen fall under the heading of “Hazardous Waste.” They, too, 
require the Ministry to work with specialized agencies, but in this case, it is to form a list of 
hazardous waste, and the other articles regulate the management and disposal of the hazardous 
waste. Article thirteen specifies that “it is forbidden to import any hazardous wastes to Palestine” 
and that passing through Palestine with hazardous waste requires a permit from the Ministry 
(Palestinian Environmental Law, 1999). 
Water Management 
Water and the environment are addressed in Section Two, articles twenty-eight through 
thirty. Similarly to solid waste, articles twenty-eight and twenty-nine declare which actors are 
responsible for setting standards and norms for water sanitation, namely the Ministry and 
specialized agencies. Article thirty addresses water contamination and how it applies to the 
management of solid waste as well. It says that it is illegal to “discharge any solid or liquid or 
other substance unless such a process conforms to the conditions and standards that the 
specialized agencies determine” (Palestinian Environmental Law, 1999). Unlike the solid waste 
articles, the articles on water management do not establish a national or local plan nor do they 
specify the actors responsible for water management. Article thirty does, however, give 
specialized agencies the power to determine what may be disposed of in waterways, thus 
indirectly giving the specialized agencies the responsibility of water management. 
Penalties and Enforcement 
Penalties for violating the Palestinian Environmental Law are addressed in Section Five. 
Each article specifies the penalty for the violation of an article in the previous sections. The 
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variation in penalties reveals the PNA’s priorities and values, as the worst violations are assigned 
the harshest punishments. For example, violations of article thirty (discharging substances not 
allowed by specialized agencies) only require a fine of 200 to 1000 Jordanian Dinars (282-1,410 
USD) and one to six months imprisonment, “or one of them.” The last part (“or one of them”) 
appears to mean the penalty of a fine, imprisonment, or a combination of the two will be applied 
depending on the severity of the offense. 
Although these are not particularly light penalties, especially the upper limit, the severity 
is among the lowest of the punishments for violation of environmental laws. Article sixty-three 
addresses the violation of article thirteen, which forbids hazardous waste importation and 
unauthorized transportation through Palestine. Violation of this law results in a fine of 3,000 to 
20,000 Jordanian Dinars (4,231-28,209 USD) with an imprisonment of three to fifteen years, “or 
one of them,” whereas the penalty for the illegal importation of hazardous waste is “eternal 
imprisonment with hard work” as well as the payment of clean-up expenses (Palestinian 
Environmental Law, 1999). This prison penalty is the harshest in the entire Palestinian 
Environmental Law, showing the PNA’s adamancy and concern for hazardous waste dumping in 
the Palestinian Territories. This fear may be rooted in the large amounts of hazardous waste 
produced by Israel and other developed neighbors. 
The enforcement mechanisms for these penalties and laws are not especially clear in 
Palestinian environmental law. In place of strong central enforcement, various municipalities 
have developed their own methods of enforcement. Some municipalities based their enforcement 
mechanisms on Jordanian law, using municipal and Ministry of Health inspectors to find 
violations and bring them to the local courts (Ziad Amra, 1998). The 2014 Water Law does 
specify that the judicial police are in charge of enforcing the Water Law, whose regulations on 
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water pollution overlap with the Palestinian Environmental Law. The judicial police have the 
power to apprehend violators and collect evidence on the crime “for the investigative and judicial 
authorities,” but law does not specify any further enforcement procedures (Water Law, 2014). 
Hence, Palestine’s environmental management enforcement system is not clearly defined, 
resulting in inefficient enforcement and frequent environmental law violations (Nour & Al-Saidi, 
2018). 
Challenges 
Despite the PNA’s legislation, ministries, and agencies, the West Bank still faces major 
challenges in water and waste management. The biggest issues cited in third-party studies, sector 
strategy plans, and regulation reform reports are infrastructure, mismanagement, resource 
restrictions, and poor public participation (Al-Khateeb et al., 2017; El-Hamouz, 2008; Nour & 
Al-Saidi, 2018; Saadeh et al., 2019; Haavisto, 2003). Through sector strategy plans and 
regulation reform reports, the authorities admit to their own large-scale mismanagement, 
particularly concerning infrastructure, but the power ultimately lies with the municipalities. 
Municipalities were the main environmental service providers before the establishment of the 
Palestinian environmental sector, so the local management practice was continued even with the 
formation of a centralized environmental management sector, despite the resulting disparities 
across the territory (Haavisto, 2003). 
Local public entities are responsible for supplying water and sanitation services as well as 
collection and proper disposal of waste, as explained above, but they each go about this slightly 
differently (Nour & Al-Saidi, 2018; Haavisto, 2003). Public-private partnerships are a significant 
contrasting feature of municipal waste management across the West Bank. Although public-
private partnerships could theoretically decrease costs and increase service coverage, local 
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authorities, such as the Joint Service Councils, struggle to cooperate with private partners 
efficiently. The struggle is partly due to financial and political restrictions from “improper MSW 
service management practices,” which continue inefficient and costly services and lead to 
negative health and environmental issues (El-Hamouz, 2008).  
Infrastructure and resource issues are both a consequence of and cause for the 
mismanagement. Throughout the literature on both water and waste management, poor 
technology, roads, and pipe quality prove to be major barriers to water and waste services since 
the services simply cannot reach the people they are meant to serve (Al-Khatib et al., 2010; Nour 
& Al-Saidi, 2018; Saadeh et al., 2019). Waste management services lack both experienced 
personnel and functioning equipment, including trucks to collect waste, so water services 
struggle to obtain the water Palestinians need (Al-Khatib et al., 2010; Ghunaim, 2016). This lack 
of resources is a motivation for forming public-private partnerships, but several failed 
agreements with private partners have limited environmental management to only using the 
municipality’s poor equipment and resources, thus defeating the purpose of the partnership, 
resulting in little progress (El-Hamouz, 2008). 
The financial stability of the private partner is also vital, and some municipalities such as 
Tubas and Jenin have attempted to partner with Jordanian companies in the past. Because of the 
companies’ weak financial standings, however, the agreements collapsed following management 
and financial issues on both ends (Saadeh et al., 2019). The Israeli occupation also deters local 
authorities from partnering with private parties; the Joint Service Councils are often required “to 
compensate the private sector in case Israeli checkpoints change and end up in longer routes than 
those initially identified,” making the partnership a drain on resources rather than an 
improvement (Saadeh et al., 2019). 
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Despite these issues, the Hebron and Bethlehem municipalities have created a successful 
joint public-private-partnership, covering more people with better infrastructure and technology 
than the other municipalities. The main reason for this successful partnership is financial; the 
local authorities must only cover 50% of the cost, while the World Bank covers the other 50% 
(El-Hamouz 2008; Saadeh et al., 2019). Researchers suggest that the World Bank’s funding is 
the main reason for the partnership's success (El-Hamouz, 2008; Saadeh et al., 2019). The 
national government tries to overcome this financial issue by providing aid to municipalities 
(Nour & Al-Saidi, 2018). The central government does not, however, effectively control how the 
money is spent, resulting in poor investments and inefficient spending and management. Lack of 
centralized management and poor coordination between municipalities prevent investments in 
joint infrastructure projects such as landfills, thereby limiting system improvements despite the 
extra aid (Saadeh et al., 2019). 
The Palestinian population experiences a “noticeably large gap between demand and 
supply in the water sector” (Ghunaim, 2016). Although demand for water is increasing due to 
both development and population growth, the supply remains low because of a lack of developed 
groundwater retrieval infrastructure and distribution and sanitation services. Some Palestinian 
communities have no water network service at all, and in some cases, drinking water has been 
contaminated due to poor waste management (Ghanem et al., 2019; Ghunaim, 2016). The 
possibility of contamination makes clear the need for proper sanitation facilities and technology 
as well as distribution systems. 
The 2014 water sector reformation attempted to address these problems by creating new 
governing bodies and specifying their roles. The Palestinian authorities made fundamental 
mistakes in their redesign, however, which has impeded the success of the reformation. One 
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issue is the lack of public awareness of the changes in water management. The public was not 
involved in the reformation process, so the people and local authorities were not able to offer 
their perspectives and were not properly informed of changes in services. This lack of awareness 
jeopardizes the legitimacy of the National Water Company as a public company in the eyes of 
Palestinians, which compromises the company's success (Nour & Al-Saidi, 2018). Additionally, 
some rural areas were neglected in the reformation process, which mainly focused on urban 
areas, resulting in gaps in Palestinian water services across the territory (Nour & Al-Saidi, 2018). 
At the moment, however, the West Bank’s water consumption is limited by Israeli 
restrictions on Palestinian water use. Palestinians cannot extract over 100 million cubic meters 
per year from groundwater even though the annual renewal is over 700 million cubic meters per 
year. Consequently, to meet the most basic needs of the people living in the West Bank, local 
authorities must buy water from Mekorot, the bulk water provider for Israel, owned by the Israeli 
government (Ghunaim, 2016; Haavisto, 2003). Thus, municipalities with less money are not able 
to provide as much water due to both their inability to extract groundwater for infrastructural and 
conflict reasons and their lack of funding to buy extra water. 
These challenges and poor environmental management also influence public opinions and 
thus public participation in environmental management. Public participation is a vital component 
of management, particularly in terms of waste management because waste must be properly 
disposed of at the source to reach its proper destination. Researchers have found predominantly 
negative attitudes among the population toward waste management in the West Bank due to its 
unreliability and poor efficiency (Al-Khateeb et al., 2017; Ghanem et al., 2019). Given poor 
public perception of waste management, people are less likely to participate, resulting in 
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improper disposal of waste, which can cause contamination of water sources or air pollution 
from burning waste (Al-Khateeb et al., 2017; El-Hamouz, 2008; Ghanem et al., 2019). 
For example, Ghanem et al.’s investigation into water quality in the Natuv water basin 
near Ramallah found that the water in the area contained unsafe concentrations of bacteria, 
notably higher than the World Health Organization minimum standards for consumable water. 
The study determined that the contamination came from leakage from nearby sewage systems 
and cesspits, consequences of improper environmental management both on the part of the 
municipality and local residents (Ghanem et al., 2019). Al-Khateeb et al.’s study surveyed the 
attitudes toward waste management in a population sample which overlapped with Ghanem et 
al.’s study. Al-Khateeb et al found predominantly negative behaviors and attitudes toward waste 
management in this area as well, again showing that poor attitudes toward waste management 
can result in alternative waste disposal, which negatively impacts the environment and other 
resources (Al-Khateeb et al., 2017). 
Negative public attitudes due to insufficient water services also result in negative 
environmental consequences. With insufficient water supplies, Palestinians look for alternatives 
to obtain water, such as building illegal wells, which negatively affect both Israel and the West 
Bank, particularly in the agricultural sector. An Israeli report on the Water Agreement from the 
Oslo Accords notes the building of unapproved wells by Palestinians, claiming that “250 
unapproved wells have been drilled, affecting Israeli production in the northern valleys” (The 
Issue of Water between Israel and the Palestinians, 2009). In response, the Palestinians 
“routinely state that the unapproved wells are affecting them as well and that they too are trying 
to combat the phenomenon” (The Issue of Water between Israel and the Palestinians, 2009). As 
discussed above, however, Palestinians do not have enough water for the population, in part due 
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to the inefficient and inadequate water management system but also because of Israeli 
restrictions (Ghunaim, 2016; Nour & Al-Saidi, 2018; Haavisto, 2003). Thus, the struggles of 
Palestinian environmental management are exacerbated by public dissatisfaction and the general 
public’s consequential actions. 
Conclusion 
Despite the laws and institutional management provided by the PNA, environmental 
management in the West Bank still lacks the resources and management necessary for success. 
Lack of a centralized management plan and uneven financial distributions across the territory 
have resulted in uneven management effectiveness in the West Bank, leaving some communities 
without any services at all, while others thrive due to outside aid. These disparities bring up the 
question of the effectiveness of nearly complete local power over water and waste management 
with blanket restrictions from the occupying Israeli forces; just because this arrangement 
precedes the PA, it may not be the best way to address such important problems. 
In the 2018 Regulation Reform Process report for the water sector, the Palestinian water 
authorities discussed the inefficiency of this model and created a new institutional framework, 
which is expected to be implemented fully by 2027. It redistributes responsibilities and 
communication among donors, service providers, and the water sector officials in the hopes that 
better mutual understanding will lead to better investment from all sides (Nour & Al-Saidi, 
2018). Another major contributor to the improvement of water and waste management in the 
West Bank are NGOs, which already play a significant role in providing various services to 
Palestinians (Haavisto, 2003). Growing the role of NGOs in collaboration with local and regional 
authorities may be key to solving issues such as water and waste management funding and 
infrastructure, but the Palestinian waste and water authorities also acknowledge the importance 
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of collaboration across borders to obtain necessary resources. Water flows between states and 
across borders, and waste can be better sorted, recycled, and dealt with by the states with the 
strong infrastructure to do so. Thus, working with the states surrounding the West Bank is 
essential to continuing the growth and improvement of the West Bank’s environmental 
management system, be it through NGOs or bilateral or multilateral agreements, all of which 




Israel and Palestine’s Environmental Management Compared 
 
Introduction 
 Israel and the West Bank share the same natural environment and resources, but because 
of differing political and social circumstances, the two have developed different institutional 
environmental management frameworks. They do, however, share some approaches, such as 
delegation to local municipalities, and some challenges, such as wide distribution of management 
responsibilities among government agencies. Nonetheless, the two governments are 
characterized by different primary issues, falling into a different primary category of 
environmental management challenges: general public and resources (Al-Khateeb et al., 2017; 
Barnard and Wahab, 2019; El-Hamouz, 2008; Tal, 2002). Israel struggles to enforce its growing 
environmental legislation because of a tradition of lacking governmental and public support, 
although there is a growing popular support for environmental practices (Tal, 2002). The West 
Bank primarily faces the resource challenge, with poor infrastructure, which subsequently results 
in poor popular support (Al-Khateeb et al., 2017). This chapter compares the institutional 
environmental management of Israel, outlined in Chapter 2, with that of the West Bank, explored 
in Chapter 3. Specifically, it describes how each government’s structures, legislation, and 
enforcement for water and waste management affects their environmental management internally 
as well as how they impact each other’s management. 
Policy Implementation Structure: Ministries vs. Municipalities 
 Both Israel and the PNA disseminate environmental responsibilities broadly across 
ministries and other governmental agencies, and both face problems of inefficiency due to this 
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decentralization. Israel’s Ministry of Environmental Protection was formed in the late 1980s, 
several decades following the foundation of the government of Israel. Until this time, 
environmental responsibilities had been addressed by other ministries up to this point, such as 
the Ministries of the Interior, Agriculture, and Health (Tal, 2002). Although many of the 
responsibilities were shifted to the Ministry of Environmental Protection, many laws concerning 
environmental management remain under other authorities, sometimes in conjunction with each 
other or the Ministry of Environmental Protection (Choshen & Laster, 2005). The Ministry does, 
however, play a significant role in implementing waste and water management legislation, as 
these areas often fall under its responsibility “for the formulation of a nationwide, integrated, and 
inclusive policy for the protection of the environment” (About Us, 2012). Even as the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection passed from minister to minister, it has taken part in amending and 
creating laws and policies concerning waste and water management.  
The PNA’s primary environmental entity, the Environmental Quality Authority, plays a 
similar role, although its responsibilities, too, are shared by several entities within the 
government. The main actors involved in water and waste management are the Environmental 
Quality Authority, Ministry of Health, Palestinian Water Authority, and Ministry of Local 
Government (Haavisto, 2003). Thus, both Israel and the PNA must coordinate environmental 
management legislation and actions across bureaucratic entities. In Israel, this has proven to be 
an obstacle, resulting in poor enforcement and development of new laws, an issue exacerbated by 
the Ministry of Environmental Protection’s poor funding and reputation in the government (Tal, 
2002; Choshen & Laster, 2005). The PNA realized that the distribution of environmental 
responsibilities might become an issue with similar results to Israel’s and therefore created the 
Sector Working Group on the Environment. The purpose of this group is to facilitate 
Schneider 66 
coordination between government agencies and donors to share information and enable efficient 
environmental management (Environment Sector Working Group, 2017). Despite this attempt to 
improve water and waste management in the West Bank, its distribution of power still poses 
issues for environmental management. 
 Both Israel and the PNA give local municipalities a significant amount of responsibility 
for waste and water management. In Israel, the Ministry of Environmental Protection works at 
the national level to develop policies, strategies, standards, and priorities for environmental 
protection, but the implementation of these national policies is left to the districts (About Us, 
2012). The amount of power given to local authorities varies depending on the management area. 
For example, local authorities are responsible for designing and constructing their own sewage 
systems, but the regulations and standards set by the national government still serve as guidelines 
(Water and Wastewater, 2012). Thus, the municipalities are given some flexibility in their 
implementation of the law through duties such as the approval and distribution of permits and 
design of sewage systems, but the regulatory power remains with the ministries. One prominent 
change during the reformation of the water sector was centralizing more of the water 
management decisions. Although certain ministries are in charge of policy, the Water Authority 
became the head of water management in the country, producing results in water management 
efficiency that were previously unattainable (The Israel Water Authority, 2012). 
 The PNA gives even greater power to its municipalities. Because the PNA was not 
founded until the 1990s, Palestinians in the West Bank needed other systems of environmental 
management, so local municipalities were the main environmental service providers (Haavisto, 
2003). This system has resulted in uneven distribution of services and environmental 
management infrastructure across the territory, an issue that continues to this day. Because of the 
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tradition and existing local foundation of environmental management, however,  the PNA 
instituted a similar system, giving municipalities primary control of their waste and water 
management and mainly serving to provide financial support and basic guidelines (Ghunaim, 
2016). This system thus allows for more flexibility in the implementation of water and waste 
management across the territory than Israel allows. Both systems have drawbacks, but 
considering the context of both territories, their respective models make sense. Although the 
Palestinian model has resulted in management disparities across municipalities, their power gives 
them the flexibility to respond to circumstances that may not be affecting other municipalities, a 
condition that is particularly pertinent to the West Bank under occupation. Since the West Bank 
is divided by checkpoints and its different parts are affected differently by settlements and 
decisions by the Israeli Defense Forces in charge of the occupation, Palestinian municipalities 
must be prepared to react to changes in circumstances that may not permit the same 
environmental management strategies across the entire territory. Israel, meanwhile, does not 
have internal checkpoints and is therefore a much more cohesive and accessible territory, so its 
individual districts require less flexibility in their environmental management and are therefore 
delegated responsibilities. 
Legal Framework: Detailed National Standards vs. Flexible Role & Goal Guidance 
 Israel and the West Bank’s environmental management structures are reflected in their 
laws. Israel’s waste and water management laws are more detailed and precise than the PNA’s 
environmental legislation. This serves to allow their respective structures to function (or not) as 
dictated by tradition. While Israel’s laws set specific standards and outline disposal of waste and 
permissible behavior concerning water, the PNA’s laws set the framework for an environmental 
management system by assigning roles and goals with few specifics on implementation. 
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As outlined in Chapter 2, Israel’s laws concerning environmental management delegate 
responsibilities, set standards, outline legal and illegal activities, and establish punishments. 
Some sections are highly specific, particularly concerning the disposal of hazardous waste and 
construction and demolition debris, requiring the same treatment of such materials across the 
country (Waste and Recycling, 2012). The law also sets specific national standards for waste 
management, attempting to incorporate sustainable goals into the structure of environmental 
management. The “Collection and Disposal of Waste for Recycling Law,” for example, has set 
and updated national recycling goals since 1993, requiring all districts to contribute to the overall 
goal for the country (Waste and Recycling, 2012). 
The PNA’s environmental law focuses more on delegating management responsibilities, 
assigning duties to the ministry (now the Environmental Quality Authority) and “other 
specialized agencies” (Palestinian Environmental Law, 1999). The language used in the law 
itself indicates the ambiguity of the Palestinian legislation compared to the Israeli; the law does 
not specify which agencies qualify as “specialized agencies,” even when discussing specific 
matters such as solid waste disposal or water management. The language and structure of the 
legislation reflects the lack of centralization in the West Bank’s environmental management 
system. It gives more flexibility to its municipalities, allowing them to respond as necessary to 
various challenges. 
Additionally, the relative lack of specificity could make the law easier to enforce or, in 
other words, to obey. If the law included exact numbers for water treatment or waste disposal, 
there would be less “wiggle room.” More simply, the PNA would have more to enforce, for 
which it does not have sufficient resources. These vague laws also make it easier to find 
loopholes in environmental policies but remain legally compliant (Koremenos, 2016). The 
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differences in municipal power in Israel and the West Bank over waste and water management 
exemplify the differences in the territories’ respective environmental legislation. Furthermore, 
the specific laws that are included draw more attention and potentially show an area of concern 
or priority. For example, hazardous waste has several specific laws, including forbidding the 
importation of any hazardous waste to Palestine, calling attention to the importance of hazardous 
waste disposal and the challenges faced by the PNA in this area (Palestinian Environmental Law, 
1999).  
Both Israel and the Palestinian National Authority include a polluter-pays policy in their 
environmental laws, serving as an indicator for each of their environmental priorities. Both Israel 
and the PNA punish the illegal dumping of hazardous and construction and demolition waste 
most harshly. In the West Bank, the penalty for the illegal importation of hazardous waste is 
either a fine of 3,000 to 20,000 Jordanian Dinars (4,231-28,209 USD) or an imprisonment of 
three to fifteen years, or both (Palestinian Environmental Law 1999). In Israel, the penalty for 
improper disposal, collection, and treatment of “construction and demolition debris, yard waste, 
tires, and vehicle scraps” is up to three years imprisonment or a fine of 404,000 New Israeli 
Shekel (117,023 USD) (Waste and Recycling, 2012). These two examples are among the 
harshest environmental mismanagement penalties in the respective governments’ laws, clearly 
marking hazardous and uncommon waste as an area of priority management. The penalties 
themselves vary significantly, however; while the Palestinian imprisonment is significantly 
longer than the Israeli maximum imprisonment (up to five times shorter), the Israeli maximum 
fine is over four times as much as the Palestinian maximum fine. Perhaps these differences 
indicate the difference in population wealth; the Palestinian fine is not as high as Israel’s simply 
because it would be ineffective since no one would be able to pay it, leaving imprisonment to be 
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the main effective penalty. In any case, despite these harsh penalties outlined by the law, both 
Israel and the West Bank struggle with enforcement of environmental management. 
Enforcement Policies and Practices: Limited Political & Public Support vs. Limited 
Infrastructure & Funding 
 Israel and the West Bank face environmental management enforcement challenges, 
indicated by poor water quality, poor and dangerous waste disposal, and underperformance on 
goals such as recycling levels. The lack of enforcement on both sides has resulted in negative 
consequences for both Israel and the West Bank, emphasizing the need for cross-border 
cooperation concerning environmental issues if sustainability is ever to be achieved. Both 
territories lack the resources for proper enforcement, however (Choshen & Laster, 2005; El-
Hamouz, 2008; Saadeh et al., 2019; Tal, 2002). Israel lacks these resources due to poor political 
support and the opinions of the general public, and the West Bank lacks the infrastructure and 
funding for proper enforcement. 
 Israel has included recycling goals in its legislation since 1993, with a progression of 
increased recycling levels over the ensuing fifteen years. The country struggled to meet the 
standards, however, because the government failed to invest adequately in public education and 
recycling encouragement (Lidman, 2019). Thus, “Israel is consistently among the lowest 
countries in the OECD [Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development] when it 
comes to recycling,” states the Ministry of Environmental Protection’s head, Oded Nezer 
(Lidman, 2019). The current recycling system in Israel requires separation of the waste at the 
source (Lidman, 2019). This system requires public education and cooperation since they must 
know how to separate their waste and divide their materials for recycling. Because of the 
increased effort on the consumer end, in general, source separation often results in less 
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participation in recycling among the public, but it results in less contamination and more 
effective recycling of the material that does end up recycled (Benedict, 2019). The Ministry of 
Environmental Protection considers the lack of public knowledge about waste management to be 
the main reason for this poor performance, which has wider consequences; because so little of 
Israel’s waste is recycled, waste usually ends up in twelve growing landfills, which come with 
their own issues. Landfills take up a large amount of land and pollute the land and the area’s 
groundwater. Israel is developing “waste-to-energy” facilities as well to address this issue and to 
reach the goal of a 50% recycling rate by 2030, but “waste-to-energy” facilities also have 
detrimental environmental consequences since they involve burning waste. This process, even 
with filters, pollutes the air of both Palestinians and Israelis, as well as contributing to 
greenhouse gas emissions (Lidman, 2019). 
 The Israeli enforcement agency, the Green Police, exemplifies Israel’s enforcement 
problems. Although the department is in charge of investigating violations of environmental law 
across the whole country, it has too few inspectors to be effective without the support of other 
departments. The budget for the entire Ministry of Environmental Protection is about 89 million 
USD, a fraction of which is given to the Green Police to cover all expenses (State Budget 
Proposal 2017-2018, 2016). These financial constraints and the agency’s lack of manpower are 
accompanied by limitations posed on the investigators’ power. They are allowed to interrogate, 
document, take samples, and issue certain penalties, but if the violation is serious enough to be a 
criminal offense, the legal department takes charge, involving bureaucratic processes and a much 
lengthier process (Tal et.al., 2010). There are currently few prospects of a solution to this 
problem. A lack of political support among politicians for the Ministry of Environmental 
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Protection ensures that the Ministry continues to struggle with insufficient resources and 
enforcement. 
 The West Bank also struggles with public education concerning environmental 
management, particularly concerning waste. The Palestinians’ struggle, however, also lies in a 
severe lack of resources and services. In several cases, because of lack of waste collection 
services, waste has been disposed of near water sources, resulting in contamination of drinking 
water from cess-pools or the burning of trash (El-Hamouz, 2008; Ghanem et al., 2018). Similarly 
to Israel, the PNA faces a shortage of trained manpower, and in districts like Tubas and Nables, 
they lack the basic infrastructure and equipment, such as waste collection vehicles or roads, for a 
functioning and reliable environmental management system (El-Hamouz, 2008; Saadeh et al., 
2019). Waste management is therefore particularly difficult and often ineffective, which results 
in a lack of faith and support from the public. Hence, instead of relying on public waste 
management services, many people choose other methods of disposal, such as burning or 
unofficial dumping. These actions exacerbate environmental issues such as water scarcity 
(Ghanem et al., 2019; Saadeh et al., 2019). Thus, even with municipalities in charge of their own 
environmental management, they are not always capable of creating and implementing a plan to 
address their own needs because they lack the necessary resources, even when supplemented by 
aid from the PNA. 
 Both Israel and the West Bank face difficulties in enforcing all basic environmental 
management regulations and practices in their own territories, but evidence also suggests that 
they fail to enforce the policies they consider most important, namely hazardous waste disposal. 
Both Israel and the PNA assign the most severe penalties to the violation of proper hazardous 
waste disposal, yet e-waste as well as construction and demolition debris from Israel are 
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regularly disposed of in the West Bank, violating both Palestinian and Israeli law. Some 
Palestinians, however, have grown to rely on the steady supply of waste from Israel, scavenging 
for valuable parts such as metals and burning the rest (Kalifa, 2019). This cycle has had 
detrimental environmental effects, blackening and contaminating once-fertile soil. The fires also 
contaminate the air, resulting in “black rain,” which, in turn, falls into water sources (Kalifa 
2019). While this issue has been brought to the attention of the Environmental Quality Agency, it 
has insisted that the local municipalities take over the decontamination process, despite their lack 
of resources (Kalifa, 2019). The Environmental Quality Agency has little power to actually stop 
the dumping of e-waste and other hazardous waste in the West Bank since it does not have 
control over its own borders (What are areas A, B, and C of the occupied West Bank?, 2019). 
This situation ultimately renders the law against the importation of hazardous waste ornamental 
and the threat of imprisonment and fines ineffective. This issue brings to light the challenge at 
the base of the PNA’s environmental management system: the occupation. The way in which the 
occupation has progressed ultimately hurts both the Palestinians and Israelis when it comes to 
environmental management since they share the same natural resources: the same air, water, and 
soil. 
Political Context: Conflict and Occupation Power Asymmetries 
The Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli conflict have resulted in many challenges for 
both Israel and the West Bank, including issues concerning environmental management. As 
discussed in the last section, poor enforcement of proper hazardous waste disposal in Israel has 
resulted in its dumping in the West Bank and a Palestinian reliance on the materials for 
livelihood (Lidman, 2019). Subsequent burning of waste pollutes the air and other natural 
resources of the area on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides, causing deleterious health and 
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environmental effects for both parties. This dumping of hazardous waste is a clear violation of 
Article Thirteen of the Palestinian Environmental Law, which forbids the importation of 
hazardous waste into the West Bank (Palestinian Environmental Law, 1999). Because of the 
Israeli occupation of the West Bank, the Palestinians do not have control of their own border and 
are thus handicapped in enforcing their environmental policy, rendering some of the few specific 
laws ineffective. The decision about enforcement lies with the Israeli guards at checkpoints; as 
indicated by the regular dumping of waste from Israel in the West Bank, the Israeli guards let the 
violation pass, demonstrating the environmental consequences of power asymmetries, 
particularly in conflict zones. Thus, the management of both waste and water is tied directly to 
the occupation and conflict. 
Israel also restricts certain activities within the West Bank, which impairs the West 
Bank’s water and waste management. There are checkpoints throughout the West Bank that 
Palestinians must pass through to travel between zones under the PNA, and these checkpoints 
often result in lengthy waits with unpredictable closures. The checkpoints pose a challenge for 
the transportation of resources and other materials such as waste, a consideration that many 
private companies take into account when hired by municipalities in partnership on waste 
management. These companies often require extra payment in the case of extended waits at 
checkpoints, further draining the local authorities’ financial resources. This extra cost is also a 
disincentive to pursuing public-private partnerships, which could theoretically and if done 
properly, help to increase the effectiveness and lower the cost of waste management (El-
Hamouz, 2008; Saadeh et al., 2019). 
Israel also controls resource use, including water. Palestinian researchers argue that Israel 
has purposefully restricted the Palestinian access to water to keep Palestine from developing and 
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to restrict access to this valuable resource to Israel (Ghunaim, 2016; Haavisto, 2003). Even if this 
is not the case, Israel has set restrictions on the amount of water Palestinians are allowed to 
extract from their water sources. The limit is about a seventh of the annual renewal of the 
groundwater and is much less than the growing population needs, so when they meet this limit, 
the municipalities in the West Bank must buy water from the Israeli company Mekorot 
(Ghunaim, 2016; Nour & Al-Saidi, 2018). The need to buy additional water puts even more 
financial strain on local authorities, making proper water management even more difficult than it 
already is in the desert. The PNA attempted to lessen this dependence and extra cost by 
reforming its water sector and creating its own National Water Company with the 2014 Water 
Law, but poor dissemination of information among the public and the continued decentralization 
of water and wastewater management and payments has impeded the reformation’s success 
(Nour & Al-Saidi, 2018). The West Bank continues to be strongly dependent on either water 
from Mekorot or expensive, imported water (Nour & Al-Saidi, 2018). The restrictions posed by 
the occupation impact the West Bank’s water management directly and its waste management 
indirectly; because of the increased financial strain and limitations on water use (for highest need 
purposes), the local municipalities’ and PNA’s resources cannot be put toward development of 
other areas of environmental management such as waste management. Since poor waste 
management results in land, air, and water pollution, as discussed above, Israel also suffers from 
its own occupation policies. 
Israel does not appear to acknowledge this connection, however. In a report requested 
and published by the Israel Water Authority, written by independent experts, titled “Water Issues 
between Israel and the Palestinians,” the PNA is accused of violating the Oslo Accords Water 
Agreement and purposefully prioritizing its own water management development over Israel’s 
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environment and its compliance with the agreement. The report highlights that the Joint Water 
Committee approved the drilling of 59 drinking water wells, 11 irrigation and agricultural wells, 
and 22 observation wells. At the time, the West Bank had not yet built all of the approved wells 
“because of their order of priority regarding the utilization of funds from donor countries,” states 
the report (The Issue of Water between Israel and the Palestinians, 2009). It accuses the 
Palestinians of having built 250 unapproved wells, however, damaging Israel’s agriculture. 
While “the Palestinians routinely state that the unapproved wells are affecting them as well and 
that they too are trying to combat the phenomenon,” the report does not consider the reason for 
this phenomenon (The Issue of Water between Israel and the Palestinians, 2009). The drastic 
difference in the number of wells approved and the unapproved number built indicate that there 
is an insufficient water supply for Palestinians. Rather than considering this issue and the 
underlying reasons for it, however, the report attributes the need for illegal wells and other 
negative impacts on Israel’s environmental resources on the PNA’s poor management of 
resources. It criticizes the Palestinian environmental enforcement problem and its negative 
effects on Israel without acknowledging the Israeli environmental enforcement problem and how 
it negatively affects the Palestinians. The report even urges the Palestinians to invest more in 
desalination plants rather than wells, again demonstrating a lack of understanding of Palestinian 
resources (The Issue of Water between Israel and the Palestinians, 2009). Electricity is an 
essential part of the desalination process, and the West Bank does not have its own power 
stations; it buys 95% of its electricity from Israel Electric Corp, Israel’s state-owned electric 
company, and the remaining 5% from Jordan (Rami Ayyub, 2019). 
The report also criticizes the “Palestinians” for not putting enough resources into 
wastewater treatment. It states: “An examination of financial investments made by the 
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Palestinians in wastewater treatment as compared with the total investments in water supply and 
wastewater installations illustrates the lack of interest on their part to treat wastewater” (The 
Issue of Water between Israel and the Palestinians, 2009). The comparison shows that the 
Palestinians had a total budget of 500 million US dollars in the period 1996-2002 (See Table 
4.1). They spent $200 million on “Wells, reservoirs, transmission mains and distribution lines,” 
$130 million on “Internal sewage systems,” and the remaining $170 was split between “Routine 
maintenance” ($80 million), “Stormwater diversion” ($60 million), and “Construction of 
institutions and training personnel” ($30 million) (The Issue of Water between Israel and the 
Palestinians, 2009). This allocation of money means that the Palestinians spent nearly a quarter 
of their budget on their sewage systems, which involves a significant portion of wastewater 
treatment and diversion. 
Table 4.1: Allocation of Donor Funds by the PNA 1996-2002 
(The Issue of Water between Israel and the Palestinians, 2009) 
Area of Spending Amount Allocated in USD 
(of 500 million) 
Wells, Reservoirs, Transmission Mains, and Distribution Lines 200 million 
Internal Sewage Systems 130 million 
Routine Maintenance 80 million 
Stormwater Diversion 60 million 
Construction of Institutions and Training of Personnel 30 million 
 
As discussions in this chapter and Chapter 3 have shown, the West Bank struggles to 
keep its water clean, making it more difficult to provide safe water to its people. At the same 
time, because the people do not have enough clean and drinkable water, they need to find new 
sources and distribution methods, and in many cases, individuals take this into their own hands 
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rather than rely on the inconsistent municipal services. Consequences of this independent action 
include illegal well-digging. The dilemma then becomes a question of how to address both issues 
without compromising either, which ultimately comes down to funding, infrastructure, and 
environmental management institutions, all of which are insufficient or ineffective. The Israeli 
report criticizes the Palestinians for insufficiently addressing both issues without acknowledging 
the underlying problem of lacking resources, infrastructure, and an effective environmental 
management institution (The Issue of Water between Israel and the Palestinians, 2009). It also 
does not grasp the reciprocal nature of environmental issues between the two entities. The report 
is not representative of all of Israel’s environmental institutions’ opinions or approaches. It was, 
however, published by the Israel Water Authority, a governmental institution, and shows how 
deeply the conflict and disillusionment about the occupation penetrates. Even a report on a 
progressive resource agreement brings in harsh judgment of Palestinian leadership and people 
without acknowledging their position or restrictions due to Israeli occupation. 
Conclusion 
Israel and the West Bank are both challenged by limited resources devoted to 
environmental management, though for different reasons. Israel’s lack of resources is a result of 
poor political support and public education on the matter. While the West Bank also struggles 
with a lack of public education concerning environmental management, its primary issues lie in 
restricted funding, lacking basic infrastructure, and the resource demands of the occupation. Both 
face the similar structural issue of a wide distribution of responsibilities across government 
agencies, but their legislation varies significantly. Israel specifies how the responsibilities are to 
be carried out, whereas the PNA’s environmental legislation does not. Although the PNA’s lack 
of specificity provides flexibility for its local municipalities, the municipalities themselves are 
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restricted by a lack of resources as well as little control over enforcement and resource use due to 
the occupation. Israel also struggles with enforcement due to poor governmental support and 
resources, which consequently negatively affects itself as well as the West Bank. Thus, the 
Israeli and Palestinian environmental management structures are inevitably intertwined and are 
affected by the consequences of each other’s challenges. This is a lose-lose situation that begs 
the question addressed in Chapter 5: What constrains their ability to adopt a more cooperative 




Could it be different? 
 
Summary 
  Israel and Palestine’s environmental management institutions both face significant 
challenges in the areas of waste and water management which negatively affect their 
environments and threaten public health. Israel has an outdated institutional framework for 
environmental management and a political status quo that conflicts with growing trends in 
popular opinion and environmental needs. The West Bank struggles with insufficient resources 
and infrastructure and an ineffective institutional framework crippled by restrictions under the 
occupation. Due to Israel’s more advanced infrastructure and power in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, its environmental management system is more effective than that of the West Bank, 
which faces the additional challenge of being under occupation. The question, then, is how to 
ameliorate this situation. 
Israel has historically used large and unsustainable amounts of water and other natural 
resources with little regard for environmental sustainability, which is reflected in the paucity of 
governmental support for environmental legislation and resources (Tal, 2002). Some of the 
public has shown increased concern for sustainable environmental practices in the past three 
decades, as demonstrated by growing numbers of environmental NGOs (Tal, 2002; Giordano, 
2018). An increase in environmental legislation and reformation of the water sector in the past 
two decades shows the effects of public agitation and increasing environmental pressures. 
However, recycling, water-use, and other resource consumption numbers from the past decade 
do not show significant improvements in this area (Kalifa, 2019; Lidman, 2019; Tal et al., 2010). 
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Illegal waste dumping and lack of funding for the enforcement department, the Green Police, 
also shows lack of actual investment in sustainable environmental management (Tal et al., 2010). 
Thus, although Israel has built a legislative foundation for environmental management and 
shows promise in its reformation of the water sector, its institutional framework, lack of 
investment and superficial commitment to sustainable environmental management make this 
foundation insufficient.  More recently, this outdated framework has come at odds with public 
opinion and has created an environmental management system that is inadequate for Israel’s 
geographical position and increasing pressures from climate change. 
 The West Bank also faces poor investment and commitment to sustainable waste and 
water management, but in this case the environmental management issues come from a lack of 
basic resources. The PNA has decentralized waste and water management, delegating most 
responsibilities to the municipalities of the West Bank (El-Hamouz, 2008, Saadeh et al., 2019). 
Although this decentralization gives the municipalities the flexibility to respond to different 
challenges that may appear given the conflict and occupation, it has also resulted in large 
variations in the water quality and waste services across the territory. Management depends on 
decisions made by the municipalities' governing bodies, the resources available, infrastructure, 
and funding. Across the territory, Israeli restrictions on movement and water extraction also 
impact the quality of the West Bank’s environmental management. Restrictions from the 
occupation require the municipalities to use more funding on services such as acquiring water 
and compensating private partners who must detour or wait at checkpoints for hours. Thus, the 
occupation takes a significant toll on the West Bank’s environmental management. With or 
without the occupation, however, the institution also faces challenges of resource distribution, 
funding, and basic infrastructure at its foundation. 
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 Environmental management in the West Bank and Israel is inextricably connected 
through physical location, access to resources, and political relationships between the two 
bodies. This interconnectedness of environmental management is becoming increasingly evident 
across the world, including between the Global North and Global South. In the case of Israel and 
the West Bank, this connection is easy to see and consider in environmental management 
because of their physical proximity, similar challenges, and different environmental management 
approaches; each entity has its own governing body with different environmental management 
laws and policies. While Israel’s laws delegate management responsibilities and dictate how they 
should be carried out, the PNA’s laws primarily delegate power to local municipalities and 
declare the goals of Palestine’s environmental management. Both the content of Israeli and 
Palestinian laws as well as their enforcement and implementation structures differ even though 
both entities face challenges in terms of obtaining sufficient resources from these structures. 
 The political relationship affects Palestinian environmental management more clearly 
than Israeli, but both feel direct and indirect impacts. The West Bank is technically under Israeli 
martial law, so even though the PNA has some authority over areas A and B, movement and 
resource extraction are both controlled by Israel (What are areas A, B, and C of the occupied 
West Bank?, 2019). Restrictions on movement and resource extraction directly impact 
Palestinian water management and impacts waste management at both the institutional and 
individual level. The unreliability of these services in the West Bank result in individuals 
extracting their own water or dumping waste illegally, both of which have severe consequences 
for the environment (El-Hamouz, 2008; The Issue of Water between Israel and the Palestinians, 
2009). These areas of management are therefore inefficient and ineffective, and due to the 
physical relationship of the two territories, Israel’s environment and resources are negatively 
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impacted as well. Given this context, could it be possible to change Israel and the West Bank’s 
environmental management into a functional, comprehensive and cooperative system? What 
challenges stand in the way of achieving that end? 
Applying Ostrom’s Common Pool Resource Framework 
The Ostrom framework offers a lens through which to consider what might be done for 
Israel and the West Bank to be able to manage their common pool resources in a more 
sustainable manner. As discussed previously, these two actors face internal institutional 
challenges in addition to a conflict between each other, all of which influence their 
environmental management and resource use. Scholars such as Aaron Wolf (1995) and Alon Tal 
(2002) as well as the NGO EcoPeace have encouraged the application of such a framework to 
develop sustainable environmental management in the region in addition to building clear 
interdependence and community, which they note could perhaps extend to help manage and de-
escalate the conflict (Giordano, 2018). In order to establish cohesive environmental management 
in the region, however, the region requires a larger framework acknowledging environmental 
interdependence, each other’s resource needs, and the need to sustainably manage the 
environment. Given the current political and institutional settings in Israel and the West Bank, 
forming this larger network will only be possible with political changes in both territories. 
 Shared natural resources such as bodies of water, un-privatized land, and air are called 
Common Pool Resources or simply the “commons.” In 1968, Garrett Hardin argued that the 
public will inevitably destroy the common resource on which it depends because each consumer 
uses the commons as if they were the only one, thus depleting the resource. This dilemma is 
called the Tragedy of the Commons (Ostrom et al., 1999). Hardin claims that the only solutions 
to this problem are socialization, meaning centralized regulation of the commons, or 
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privatization. Both of these solutions also degrade resources, however (Ostrom et al., 1999). In 
Israel, for example, although the water law regulates the use of its common pool water resources, 
they have faced degradation due the government’s historical focus on consumption and human 
development rather than environmental health (Tal, 2002; The Issue of Water between Israel and 
the Palestinians, 2009; Water Authority Home, 2019). Elinor Ostrom investigated the short-
comings of Hardin’s solutions to the Tragedy of the Commons and pointed out that there are 
cases in which people have built systems of common pool resource community-management that 
have functioned for decades and centuries (Ostrom et al., 1999). She constructed a framework of 
eight principles that lead to successful management of common pool resources. The framework 
includes conditions that must be met in some form to overcome the incentive for people to 
follow their short-term interests, the mentality that leads to environmental degradation and 
depletion of the commons (Williams, 2018). 
 Ostrom’s first principle states that “commons need to have clearly defined boundaries” 
(Williams, 2018). The community must understand the benefits it gets for taking care of a 
resource and setting an ecosystem’s boundaries helps define this broader community. A resource 
with defined boundaries has a community that can gather around a sense of mutual responsibility 
for the resource. It asks the question: “Who is entitled to access to what” within these 
boundaries? (Williams, 2018). This is the underlying question of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
and will not be solved in a broad discussion about who is responsible for which natural 
resources. 
Nevertheless, perhaps considering it from a more local perspective could help lay a 
foundation for a bigger answer to the question. For example, communities could re-define 
boundaries and resource access based on geographical proximity to the resource. It would force 
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people and institutions to recognize which resources serve which people, and these people could 
be both Israelis and Palestinians. Geographical communities could be composed, for instance, of 
Palestinian housing surrounded by an Israeli settlement. This recognition could be a step toward 
fostering the sense of a shared place or community, joined around a common responsibility for a 
natural resource, an understanding Wondolleck and Yaffee (2000) recognize as a vital 
component of collaboration around natural resources. 
Fostering this sense of community in any environment is difficult, but in the case of Israel 
and the West Bank it seems nearly impossible. The infrastructure itself is built to keep 
Palestinians and Israelis apart. Even when they are practically neighbors, living meters apart, 
there is a fence several meters high keeping them separate (The Palestinian family with its own 
checkpoint, 2020). Thus, even when sharing a common natural resource, there is no space for 
people to convene or build a community. Even attempts over social media and other online 
platforms such as Zoom have been met with criticism and sometimes consequences as severe as 
imprisonment (Halbfinger & Abuheweila, 2020). Perhaps environmental matters are a chance to 
work past these obstacles, however, since the question of environmental management is 
something both Israelis and Palestinians must deal with on both the local and institutional levels. 
The urgency of environmental matters today might also contribute to a sense of “community of 
necessity.”  
 The second principle states that “rules should fit local circumstances” (Williams, 2018). 
This principle may seem evident, and Israel and the West Bank’s institutions are incorporating 
this principle to some extent already. However, they are not following mutually agreed upon 
rules for resource use in the shared ecosystem; they are following their own rules for their own 
portion of the ecosystem. The PNA’s delegation of power to its municipalities, for example, is an 
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attempt to let local circumstances determine management. The power of environmental 
management institutions in those municipalities can only pertain to Palestinians, though, at the 
moment, so it is unable to take into account the whole local circumstance. An application of this 
principle to Israel and the West Bank would involve local agreements concerning the resources 
and methods of waste disposal within the boundaries defined by the first principle. To help this 
principle be realized, rather than have the authorities discuss and make rules for their 
environmental management from the distant perspectives of Israeli and Palestinian politicians, 
locals should do so for their own resources and the individuals connected to those resources. 
Initiatives and discussions like this already exist under the guidance of NGOs and institutions 
such as the Arava Institute of Israel and EcoPeace Middle East (Community Project, n.d.; Mayo, 
n.d.). The Arava Institute in particular is focusing on peacebuilding through local environmental 
initiatives that involve Israelis and Palestinians (as well as some work with Jordanians and 
Moroccans) to develop local environmental improvement and management systems (Mayo, n.d.). 
These initiatives show that approaching environmental management at a local level can lead to 
collaboration between Israelis and Palestinians, marking this principle as a key approach to 
moving toward a more cohesive management system in the region. 
 Ostrom’s third principle relates to community engagement as well: “Participatory 
decision-making is vital” (Williams, 2018). The West Bank already has a system that works from 
the local level, and Israel leaves some of the decisions to local actors, particularly concerning 
waste management. This system already lays a foundation for implementing the third principle, 
but there are still major obstacles to fully realizing it. The Israeli and Palestinian environmental 
institutions interact with each other minimally, and Palestinians themselves are not well-
informed or influential participants in their waste and water management systems. As discussed 
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previously, in order to be successful, the region needs a comprehensive environmental 
management system and understanding, but decisions concerning regional environmental 
management do not involve both sides equally in the decision-making process at the moment. 
Historically, Israel’s military and political power has also given it the bigger voice in such 
matters as well (Wolf, 1995). As Wolf points out, "the two conditions at the core of political 
viability of water-sharing are equity of the agreement or project, and control by each party of its 
own primary water sources” (1995). Israel has consistently dominated resource control, and even 
in the Water Agreement, had significant influence in dictating the PNA’s management of its 
water sources (The Issue of Water between Israel and the Palestinians, 2009; Wolf, 1995). In 
this context, working at a local level to involve as many people as possible in the decision-
making process for local environmental management may be the most “equitable” approach; it 
establishes a form of local democracy which transcends borders and allows previously silenced 
voices to be heard. It also addresses Palestinians’ mistrust of their management systems, since 
they would have some power in securing their reliability. Conditions of equity and popular 
control over natural resources is a fundamental element of Arava and EcoPeace’s local 
initiatives, which give decision-making power to the locals involved (Community Project, n.d.; 
Mayo, n.d.). With individuals in charge of decision-making, they are more likely to comply 
because they had a say in how things function. In other words, they have some level of 
ownership over the decisions given that they were informed by local interests, concerns and 
capabilities. This does not mean that everyone will always comply, however, leaving us with the 
question of how we know that everyone is complying and if not, then who is not, as well as how 
to deal with people who do not comply. Ostrom’s fourth and fifth principles deal with these 
questions. 
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 The fourth principle considers the question of the position of authority in the context of 
environmental management. It states that “commons must be monitored” (Williams, 2018). This 
principle is designed to deter noncompliance and the dominance of individuals’ short-term 
interests over the common good and is therefore an essential component of the system. One of 
the main reasons Israel and the West Bank’s environmental management systems are faulty is 
that they do not have effective enforcement mechanisms, including monitoring. Effective and 
efficient monitoring is therefore a component that the region must develop. But who is to 
monitor communities of both Israelis and Palestinians? Should it be an institutional mechanism 
involving both Israeli and Palestinian authorities? Will they be able to trust each other enough to 
collaborate at a higher institutional level, and does either side actually have the resources to 
successfully monitor? Given the current environmental management institutions, their lack of 
resources and infrastructure, and political tensions, the answer to these questions seems to be 
“no.” In an environment where so much has been essentially dictated “from the top,” monitoring 
may be an extremely divisive issue and may actually encourage resistance and symbolic 
noncompliance. 
A potential solution might be to designate a third-party monitor, a method many 
international agreements turn to when there is a lack of trust among members (Koremenos, 
2016). Although this approach does not solve the top-down issue, it may mitigate accusations of 
noncompliance and political tensions between parties on a local and higher level. The third party 
would have to be a non-partisan actor, however, thus ruling out most states. A non-partisan 
environmental NGO might be a promising candidate since NGO expertise in environmental areas 
renders them credible and reduces concerns over political bias. This NGO must be credible to 
both the Palestinian and Israeli citizens and governments. Additionally, since neither side has 
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effective enforcement mechanisms, introducing a third party to monitor may bring in new 
resources to build a foundation for effective monitoring and enforcement in the future. 
 The fifth principle involves those who misuse the commons: “Sanctions for those who 
abuse the commons should be graduated” (Williams, 2018). Graduated sanctions involve a 
system of warnings and fines to avoid resentment and further misuse (Williams, 2018). Both 
Israel and the West Bank’s environmental management systems have graduated punishments 
already, as both include a range of progressive punishments for breaking environmental laws. 
These systems of punishment do not take into account the ecosystem as a whole, instead 
focusing on the jurisdiction of Israel and the West Bank and their resources. Thus, two issues 
arise in the application of this principle: building a cohesive system of sanctions that affect 
Israelis and Palestinians in the same way to protect the commons as a whole and deciding who 
enforces these sanctions. In this case, similarly to monitoring, there is the question of which 
institution will carry out sanctions against violators. 
Ostrom’s framework is based on the development of a common governance system built 
by the communities sharing the commons, so the first issue may be addressed by focusing on 
developing common systems of punishment on local levels among communities that share 
commons. The issue of trust arises again, however, particularly when considering the second 
issue as well; will Israelis be as strict among themselves as with Palestinians and vice versa? 
Here, the establishment of written rules and agreements is necessary and may help, and if a 
credible third party is in charge of monitoring, then neither side will have to worry about the 
other being unfair. If the written rules clearly outline what the graduated sanctions are, then they 
will leave little room for interpretation. Thus, the monitor will become the actor determining 
which sanctions are to be implemented because it will be aware of the severity of the abuse. In 
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theory, this combination of precision and delegation could help to establish a long-term 
cooperative framework. 
 Even with sanctions and a solid agreement, conflicts will inevitably arise. Hence, 
principle six: “Conflict resolution should be easily accessible” (Williams, 2018). Ostrom’s 
framework emphasizes that everyone should be able to “take their problems for mediation, and 
nobody is shut out,” which is particularly relevant given tensions and mutual lack of trust in the 
region (Williams, 2018). It is imperative that problems be managed rather than ignored. In order 
for this problem management to occur, there need to be physical spaces to convene, where both 
parties are comfortable or at least feel that they are equal and, moreover, will be treated fairly. 
The political situation, trust, and infrastructure each pose significant barriers to implementing 
this principle. Because infrastructure across the West Bank is purposefully built to separate 
Israelis and Palestinians, it would be difficult to find such a place. Perhaps the location of natural 
resources themselves could work in some cases; the site might provide a physical place for 
equality, since both sides use it. Additionally, meeting at the location of the natural resource 
could emphasize “recognition of shared goals and interests” embodied by the resource and 
“shared problems or fears,” understandings that Wondolleck and Yaffee (2000) recognize as 
essential parts of successful collaboration. When the resource is an underground aquifer or 
landfill and used by more than just the surrounding locals, it makes this solution more difficult, 
however, so perhaps specific buildings near the resource should be designated for this purpose. 
The principle additionally calls for a moderator, which may again require a mutually-
acceptable third party to manage the distrust between Israelis and Palestinians. Issues may, of 
course, arise between people of the same side as well, but in order to maintain equity and 
structure, this mediator for internal disputes should also be the same third party. The two main 
Schneider 91 
challenges here would be finding a credible moderator and making the place of meeting 
convenient and accessible for anyone with a complaint. As discussed under principles four and 
five, the moderator could be a credible environmental NGO with the environment as its foremost 
interest. Making a convenient and accessible place of meeting and complaints would require 
resources and accessibility in addition to political space that neither party has at the moment. 
 The seventh principle states that “commons need the right to organise” (Williams, 2018). 
Again, the issue of common spaces arises, an issue at the foundation of the conflict and 
occupation. If there is no space to convene, discuss, relate, a community cannot come out of it 
united around a common resource. “The right” referenced in the principle is also a major 
obstacle because in some cases it is against the law to convene. Under an Israeli martial law, 
Israelis are not permitted to enter Area A of the West Bank without explicit permission, so 
although there are Israeli settlements such as the Hebron settlement beside Palestinian towns in 
Area A, they are not permitted to interact (Mishkin, 2018). Therefore, establishing the right to 
convene will need to come directly from political change in addition to social change and 
initiative. All of these requirements from the Ostrom framework do involve political change to 
some extent, however, including principle eight. 
 Principle eight states that “commons work best when nested within larger networks” 
(Williams, 2018). Hence, although individual initiatives may contribute to the improvement of 
environmental management, they function at a higher level when they are part of a larger system. 
This concept makes sense from an ecological point of view as well because ecosystems and their 
resources are all connected. Thus, if one common pool resource is well-managed and the others 
are not, then that resource will still be negatively impacted. Likewise, if Israel has an excellent 
environmental management system, and the West Bank does not, neither will be entirely 
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successful. In order for each community commons management and environmental initiative to 
work, a larger framework must be realized, inevitably involving authorities. Given the current 
political context, including that of Israeli and Palestinian environmental institutions, significant 
political changes must occur for the successful management of common pool resources. 
Conclusion 
 The main issues challenging adoption of Ostrom’s framework in the Israel and West 
Bank context are: lack of trust between Israelis and Palestinians; lack of physical and social 
space to convene and form a community; conflict over defining boundaries of resources and who 
has access to them; insufficient environmental management capacity; and lack of political will to 
institute the changes discussed here. There are, however, possible ways of addressing these 
issues. Introducing a third party recognized as non-biased by both sides may be a way of 
providing monitoring and enforcement without forcing both sides to trust the other with power. 
Bringing in a third party capable of monitoring would also help address the issue of insufficient 
management resources and tools. This third party could be an environmental NGO perceived as 
unbiased by both sides with its primary focus on environmental and public health. These focuses 
would make the organization more credible and draw attention farther from the conflict and 
closer to the issues begging collaboration. Many NGOs around the world have already set a 
precedent as credible monitors of behavior such as environmental management and human 
rights. Approaching common pool resource management from a local level and involving 
consumers in decisions about the resource can help build a community around the resource and 
build a sense of trust. Communities that do have physical spaces in which Israelis and 
Palestinians might convene can set precedent for communities that are blocked by law or 
physical barriers who can find ways to circumvent these obstacles. Some communities in Gaza 
Schneider 93 
have started online conferences simply to establish friendship through platforms such as Zoom, 
for example (Halbfinger & Abuheweila, 2020). 
Despite these potential solutions, the success of collaborative environmental management 
in Israel and the West Bank is ultimately contingent upon political change at least as far as 
environmental management is concerned. Local initiatives cannot be entirely successful if they 
are not part of a larger system also working toward sustainable environmental management, and 
in order to create a functioning network in Israel and the West Bank, both authorities must make 
fundamental changes to their environmental management institutions. They must also be open to 
collaborating together on this management of mutual resources and waste management. The 
Israeli population’s trend in support of environmental sustainability holds potential for Israel’s 
internal environmental transformation, but the current political scene in Israel concerning 
Palestinians must also change. The Palestinians have less control over reforming their 
environmental institutions because of their lack of resources and infrastructure. These problems 
must therefore be addressed by economic means either before or in the process of changing 
environmental institutions. Given the current challenges faced by Israel and the West Bank, 
collaboration on environmental management on a large scale does not appear particularly 
promising. 
 Nonetheless, both sides acknowledge the growing importance of water and waste 
management as populations grow and climate change makes resources less reliable. Perhaps this 
knowledge will bring the two sides together in environmental management, if not in anything 
else. In order to better understand how this collaboration might happen, further research is 
needed on the political and environmental position of Israeli settlements because their 
environmental management is separate from those of Israel and the West Bank. Another 
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important actor affected by Israel and the West Bank’s water and waste management is Jordan. It 
shares the Jordan River and is near enough to be directly affected by other forms of pollution in 
Israel and the West Bank and vice versa (Wolf, 1995). Therefore, further research on regional 
interactions with Jordan and on potential collaboration for both water and waste management 
would be a vital addition to environmental and peace studies in the region. 
From an optimistic perspective, environmental management cooperation could be the 
first step towards a larger cooperative framework (Wolf, 1995). Parties outside the region could 
focus on environmental cooperation in order to promote peace without implicating ideological or 
political positions; environmental problems are universal and do not take “sides.” Scholars and 
NGOs are proposing methods of collaboration, taking into account the increasingly urgent need 
to address issues such as water scarcity in Israel and the West Bank. EcoPeace has proposed a 
policy of interdependence between Israel, the West Bank, and Jordan based on the development 
of desalination as the main source of freshwater in Israel and the West Bank. They would also 
provide this water to Jordan in exchange for renewable solar-powered energy from Jordan 
(Giordano, 2018). The plan would provide water and sustainable energy to the region, helping 
Israel reach its climate goals set at the Paris climate summit and decrease the Palestinian reliance 
on Israeli electricity and water (Giordano, 2018). In many ways, these activities by NGOs in the 
region are building the needed foundation upon which future cooperation might be instituted. 
Plans such as this one from EcoPeace take into account many of the factors of Ostrom’s 
framework, especially the need for a larger network, a concept that applies to the whole world’s 
environmental management. In the case of greenhouse gas emissions, for example, even if one 
country is carbon neutral, the atmosphere, including the air in that country is still polluted by the 
rest of the world. Therefore, the case of Israel and the West Bank can serve as an exemplary case 
Schneider 95 
for the rest of the world to evaluate as it attempts to solve environmental management issues that 
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